China and Iran are two countries separated by language and culture but united through oil exports and shared distrust in the West. As China’s importance on the world stage increases, current political international trends have been irritating this important relationship. Most notably, the US has been pressuring China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to pass new economic sanctions against Iran. These sanctions would be a direct response to Iran’s new uranium enrichments attempts, which Iran insists are purely for civilian interests. Although China does support the UN’s demand for Iran’s enrichment program in Qom to be halted because it violates rules of the IAEA, it will not easily agree to proposed sanctions. China’s expected inaction over the matter will only serve to reinforce its historical position that diplomacy should be favored over harsher solutions in Iran.

Relying on Iran for almost 10% of its petroleum imports, China does not wish to place a finger on one of its main economic arteries. When dealing with Iran, China has always favored to solve problems with minimal confrontation. While this does not always make for good and effective foreign policy, it has brought the two countries closer together economically and politically. Iran’s desire to fully join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, is well known. As of 2010, Iran only has an observer membership status with the organization; a full membership would mean closer economic ties with China and the rest of Asia, which would in turn undermine US foreign policy in the Middle East. While Tehran has been actively developing its relationship with Beijing, China has become more and more dependent on Iranian imports.

China is increasingly dependent on foreign natural resources and is projected to outstrip its domestic oil resources within the next 15 years. Although China does possess a large percent of the world’s coal supply it lacks the industry and technology required to unearth it, ironically making coal one of China’s biggest imports. Therefore, in 2004 China signed onto a 100 billion dollar deal, by which China will purchase petroleum from Iran and help develop Iran’s Yadavaran oil fields. In addition, China also pledged to spend over 20 billion dollars more over the next quarter-century in Iran.

To western dismay, China-Iran relations are not only presently strong, but they are also deeply tied to future economic and political interests. This relationship cannot be easily brushed aside as the west would have itself believe. Consequently, as China tries to impose stability in its Iranian investments, the west continues to push for renewed sanctions against Iran, in efforts to destabilize Iran’s ruling regime and its agenda.

China is still wary of using the preferred tool of ‘western hegemony’, as China itself has bared sanctions and knows the extent of their effectiveness. With vested interests in both parties involved, Iran and the US, China walks a narrow line and approaches the subject with split views. On one hand, explains Li Goufu a Middle East expert at the China Institute of International Studies, “If we persist in sanctioning Iran, isolating it and backing it into a corner, then we may end up with a result which nobody wants to see.” On the other hand, he explains on NPR, “Do western nations really want to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful, diplomatic means?” he asks. “Or are they simply using the nuclear issue as an excuse to achieve other aims, such as overthrowing the Iranian government?” This circular thinking, which well embodies eastern thought, has been clearly labeled as ‘inaction’ by the west. As western patience grows thin, China is clearly deciding between the only two viable options that it sees: continue peace talks with Iran, or simply abstain from the vote in the UN Security Council.

China will most likely end up deciding to continue peace talks with Iran, as they are in China’s own best interest for several reasons.  Firstly, China has either voted for or abstained from three other sanctions on Iran, all of which have proven fruitless. Despite all three sanctions, which China backed only after every other method was exhausted, Iran still managed to develop a secret nuclear facility. Sanctions have clearly done nothing to hold back Iran’s nuclear program, if anything they have served to increase Iran’s desire for one. Armed with this knowledge, China has even more disincentive to back future sanctions. More importantly, as China gets savvy to the methods of the west, it becomes more aware of their true intentions of sanctioning Iran. China sees sanctions as a smoke screen disguising the desire in the west to overthrow Iran. Future military action in Iran will most certainly threaten Chinese interests there, thus making the need for peaceful talks that much greater.

Secondly, China sees no immediate danger in the nuclear development of one its own allies. Indeed the road to uranium enrichment is long, and even if Iran manages to quickly enrich more than 90% of its uranium, which is more than civil uses require, why destabilize a 100 billion dollar petroleum import agreement? To the Chinese it’s a simple matter of timing; China is not in a rush to make a decision on this matter and is not likely to respond to western demands anytime soon as was demonstrated during the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference.

Thirdly, China believes its heavy investment in the Middle East will help stabilize the region. Iran is not the only Middle Eastern country that China has invested in; China has tried to diversify its imports. Investing in Saudi Arabia and even in Iraq, China’s blanket investments in the Middle East could create a new system of balance and control. When a country grows at the rate equivalent to one Brazilian economy every four years, such investment in resources might create an unparalleled centripetal force in the Middle East.

Lastly, recent events such as the new defense contracts with Taiwan and the highly publicized Obama-Dalai Lama meeting have only served to harm Sino-US relations, as the Chinese government has openly admitted. An embittered China will have no good reason to heed to western desires, when it feels that its own are being ignored.

All in all, a blunt and tooth-less sanction is just too narrow minded for the Chinese to agree to and will never address all the issues that China finds important. Whether China will follow suit with Russia and give into western powers is still up in the air. China however is most likely not going to vote for a fourth round of economic sanctions, not unless the west can scramble together a big incentive. Even then, the most that China could promise to deliver would be an abstaining vote on the UN Security Council.

For further reading, please visit:

China Unlikely to back new sanctions against Iran

Ai Yang and Zhang Haizhou for China Daily

January 18, 2010

As Iraq Stabilizes, China Bids on Its Oil Fields

Keith Bradsher for The New York Times

June 30, 2009

Iran’s new alliance with China could cost US leverage

Robin Wright for The Washington Post

November 17, 2004

China Forced to find balance between U.S., Iran

Anthony Kuhn for National Public Radio

March 1, 2010

Time to get tough: Will further Sanctions deter Iran?

The Economist

March 1, 2010

Iran begins cruise missle production

Nasser Karimi for The Associated Press (Huffington Post)

March 7, 2010

How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen Deal?

Mark Lynas for the Guardian

December 22, 2009

China Signals Defiance on U.S. Relations

Andrew Batson, Terence Poon, and Shai Oster for The Wall Street Journal

March 8, 2010

Iran says hopes China won’t bow to sanction pressure

Reuters News

March 9, 2010

“The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth…but not the Mineral Rights.”

Introduction

The “Resource Curse” has puzzled many scholars. Why do countries that have an abundance of valuable natural resources continue to suffer economically? This trend, first recognized by Harvard University economists Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner, has great implications for countries that wish to grow financially while making use of their natural resources. These countries have a comparative advantage at producing their commodities, yet it seems as if they are unable to supply the world without hurting their economies in the process.

However, there are outliers to this phenomenon. Among these countries are Norway, Canada, and Botswana. For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on Botswana because it is an outlier in many ways. Botswana is not only an outlier of the resource curse, but an outlier of the global south, and Africa in general. It is one of the few countries that have been able to flourish economically despite being in unfortunate company. Unlike Canada and Norway, Botswana is distinctly non-western, and has a more recent history of colonization. The nation became independent of its European colonizers less than fifty years ago. Yet, we look at Botswana as a model for economic growth in a continent plagued—both figuratively and literally—by poverty, disease, famine, and corruption.

But why has Botswana been able to succeed? How has it become a beacon of hope among nations often stereotyped as hopeless? This is not to say that Botswana is without calamity. The nation still suffers from a grotesque presence of HIV and AIDS—among the highest in the world, even for an African country. However, in terms of economic growth, Botswana has exceeded nearly all states over the past few decades (Background note: Botswana).

I hypothesize that Botswana has been able to avoid the resource curse for several reasons. Primarily, we will focus on Botswana’s record of corruption—or lack thereof—in comparison to the world. The data shows that there is a strong positive correlation between high per capita GDP and low corruption. We will also examine what, if any, effects investment in human capital has had on economies internationally, and whether Botswana has followed the appropriate trends. I hypothesize that Botswana has followed the appropriate investment trends that lead to economic growth. In terms of investment in primary education, the data show that there is a negative correlation between countries that invest heavily in primary education and growth in gross domestic product—Botswana follows this rule. With regards to investment in secondary and tertiary education, I hypothesize that Botswana’s heavy investment has allowed for economic prosperity. However, no correlation is found between gross domestic product growth and investment in secondary and tertiary education.

Lastly, we will use qualitative data to examine Botswana’s history of colonialism, economic policies, and type of diamond resources in order to discover whether or not these factors have contributed to Botswana’s economic success. These factors will then be compared to Sierra Leone’s history of colonialism, economic policies, and type of diamond  resources. These countries are compared in juxtaposition in order to discover what effect these factors have had on their economies. I hypothesize that Botswana has been able to flourish economically because of its proper investment in education (which will be defined shortly), its short history of colonization in comparison to Sierra Leone, its laissez faire economic policies, and its non-alluvial diamonds resources—all of which are in direct contrast to those of Sierra Leone.

The Research Puzzle

Broadly speaking, our research question asks, “Why do nation’s that have an abundance of natural resources continue to suffer economic losses?” We are to discover this by examining Botswana as an outlier to the trend. Although eighty percent of Botswana’s exports are composed of natural resources, the nation’s economy has grown tremendously. Botswana’s average percent growth in gross domestic product over the last few decades has been well over seven percent (Background note: Botswana). Furthermore, we seek to discover what lessons other nations can learn from Botswana to be able to follow in its footsteps.

This research question is not new, but has not been directed toward Botswana and its relatively low corruption rate. We hypothesize that Botswana has been able to evade the resource curse and grow economically because of its relatively low degree of corruption in comparison to its natural resource harvesting neighbors. Furthermore, we examine what effects Botswana’s homegrown traditional institutions have had on its society in bolstering legitimacy and deterring corruption. Additionally, I hypothesize that Botswana has been able to avoid resource exploitation and corruption because of the type of diamonds that are present in Botswana—non-alluvial diamonds. I also hypothesize that Botswana has been able to flourish economically because of good economic practices that have encouraged foreign direct investment throughout the nation.  Moreover, I theorize that Botswana has been able to expand economically because it has followed economic trends with respect to investment in education that support continued economic growth.

This hypothesis is probabilistic – Botswana is simply an outlier to the resource curse. Many countries that have an abundance of natural resources also suffer from either declining gross domestic product, or simply have a difficult time growing economically. When examining Botswana as an outlier to this trend, we are able to discover why this is true. The data holds that countries that are more corrupt are less likely to have robust economies. This isn’t to say that all countries that are considered to have corrupt regimes or governments do not grow economically, but that countries that are less corrupt are more likely to experience economic growth (as illustrated by the data). This is conveyed by comparing Botswana to Sierra Leone—a nation that suffers from rampant corruption. With regard to economic policies, the hypothesis is also deterministic. The data shows that Botswana has been able to grow economically because of its laissez faire economic policies in comparison to Sierra Leone. However, these policies are not present in all nations, and Botswana is certainly not the only country in the world that has experienced economic growth. The study will seek to compare Botswana and Sierra Leone, seeing that the two countries have varied in growth (Figure 1).

In terms of the type of diamonds harvested in Botswana, the hypothesis is probabilistic. By examining and comparing Botswana to Sierra Leone, the qualitative data suggest that countries that have alluvial diamond reserves are more prone to corruption, and, therefore, economic adversity. Since the study is only comparing two countries, Botswana and Sierra Leone, the hypothesis can only be considered probabilistic because it does not examine all diamond producing countries.

Literature Review

Today’s world has become drunk on natural and mineral resources. Non-renewable resources have become an extremely valuable product in the world’s economy. However, it seems that nations with the largest supplies of natural resources (oil, mineral, or otherwise) also suffer from some of the poorest economies. This study seeks to discover why countries that export large amounts of non-renewable resources have a tendency to be underdeveloped.         It also seeks to discover what, if any, outliers exist, and why they exist. The economic effects of the resource curse are often referred to as “Dutch Disease.” This term refers to the Netherland’s shrinking private sector and economic diversity of exports following the discovery of large natural gas fields in 1959 (Aarts et. al. 1996, 23).  The phenomenon occurs because countries that invest heavily in the exportation of natural resources like oil, gas, and diamonds, end up increasing the value of their currency. As a result, their other exports become more expensive for other countries to buy, and therefore, trade for those goods decline (Collier (2007), 40).

The resource curse was first proposed by Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner in “Natural Recourses Abundance and Economic Growth” (1997). Their piece found that “economies with abundant natural resources have tended to grow less rapidly than natural-resource-scarce economies” and, furthermore, “resource-poor economies often vastly outperform resource-rich economies in economic growth” (Sachs and Warner 1997, 2). These natural resources are defined as agricultural and mineral resources as well as fuel. Economies that export large quantities of these types of goods have a tendency to gradually decline in annual GDP overtime. Sachs and Warner found this correlation while tracking 97 different countries’ GDPs from 1970 to 1989—despite controlling for additional factors like initial GDP and varying trade policies.

Sachs and Warner found that natural resource abundance resulted in a decrease in GDP growth despite the fact that “natural resources raise the wealth and the purchasing power over imports, so that resource abundance might be expected to raise an economy’s investment and growth rates” (1997, 4). Sachs and Warner conclude that there is a strong inverse relationship between “natural resource intensity and [economic] growth” between 1970 and 1990 while accounting for variables like “initial GDP, trade policy, investment rates, term of trade volatility, inequality, and the effectiveness of the bureaucracy” (1997, 9). The only exceptions found were Malaysia and Mauritius who sustained a 2 percent growth rate between 1971 and 1992 (Sachs; Warner 1995).

But is this resource curse never-ending? Hong addresses this question by askin, “Do the effects of Dutch Disease continue beyond 20 years?” (19). She concludes that the resource curse can be considered “time specific” and also states that “context matters,” meaning that specific case studies will retrieve different results. For example, Hong attributes the declining GDP of certain oil rich countries during the period of 1970 to 1990 to the “repercussions from the global oil shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s,” as opposed to the natural resource curse (2009, 5). Additionally, Hong finds that smaller countries are more vulnerable to the resource curse, seeing that their exports are less divers, while larger countries with more diverse export industries are less likely to suffer because their economies do not depend upon only one or two exports (Hong 2009, 5).

A country’s investments—whether in multiple industries or sectors appears to key to studying the resource curse. Birdsall explains the resource curse through human capital investment. She found that resource abundant countries also have a tendency to invest less in education (2001, 3). She argues that resource poor countries have a greater tendency to invest more in secondary education as opposed to resource rich countries, accounting for a less diverse economy where individuals growing up in resource rich countries will continue to work the same jobs as those before them. Birdsall has also found that mineral and natural resource rich countries have a tendency to create societies with large income disparities between social classes (2001, 4). These upper class families are also likely to evade tax burdens which go toward lower class education—preventing human capital investment.  In contrast, resource poor countries are more likely to invest in human capital. This allows these countries to keep up with technological changes. Such countries “are more likely to press for a workforce able to adapt to constantly changing technologies and processes” (Birdsall 2001, 4). Hong finds that government spending on education in resource-rich countries is unsuccessful because of the nature of the labor market. Since the labor market does not reward education, there is “little investment beyond the natural resource sector” (Hong 2009, 7).

Other theories have also been proposed. Manzano and Rigobon correlate declining GDP in resource rich countries to wealth mismanagement (2007). They have “the so called ‘Natural Resource Curse’ might be related to debt overhang” (Manzano and Rigobon 2007, 5). During the 1970’s and 80’s (when many of these natural resources were sold at a high price) many resource abundant countries used their exports as collateral for debt. Then in the 80’s, price falls led to substantial debt. Manzano and Rigobon found this to be a legitimate cause of annual GDP decay (2007).

Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, many countries have experienced resource curse-like symptoms. However, Botswana, a major diamond producer, has proven to be a true outlier in this trend. In fact Botswana’s GDP has grown, on average, 7.8% annually—the highest annual economic growth among nations in the region (Fofack 2009, 1). Fofack has found that Botswana’s people have benefited from this growth. Both per capita income and living standards have improved (2009, 1). Fofack argues that Botswana’s success comes from its ability to “foster economic diversification and value addition through local processing- diamond cutting, polishing and marketing- in a step that in the long term should enhance job creation and poverty reduction” (2009, 1). He also attributes Botswana’s success to government accountability and its lack of corruption “rooted in traditional institutions” (Fofack 2009, 1). He believes that these institutions have saved Botswana and prevented “rampart greed” which, Fofack argues, allows for development efforts to continue (2009, 2). One of these institutions is the “Kgotla” which allows for a “system of consultations between citizens and traditional rulers” to increase transparency and “the participation of the people in decision-making processes” (Fofack 2009, 2). Ultimately, Fofack believes that Botswana’s traditional institutions have resulted in altruistic leaders who have alleviated Botswana of corruption—in contrast to other resource rich countries where rampart corruption has only lead to poverty (2009, 2).

Iimi follows a similar trend, and argues that “governance determines the extent to which the growth effects of the resource wealth can materialize” (2007, 5). She believes that in developing countries, “the quality of regulation, such as the predictability of regulations, and anticorruption policies, such as transparency and accountability in the public sector, are most important for effective natural resource management and growth” (Iimi 2007, 5). Most importantly, Iimi finds that natural resource abundance is volatile because “natural resource wealth sows the seeds of discord and conflict among domestic stakeholders, such as politicians, developers, local tribes, and citizens” (Iimi 2007, 8). In addition, politicians and government leaders are also unlikely to pay much attention to their people’s strife. This is because state revenues come from mineral or natural resource reserves as opposed to levied taxes—therefore law makers become less accountable for common people’s economic problems (Iimi 2007, 9).  As a result, little effort is made to alleviate economic hardships, invest in education and human capital, diversify national industries, or share natural resource wealth by opening up opportunities to the public—all of which would increase national GDP (Iimi 2007, 10-11). In the case of Botswana, Iimi cites that the nation has been able to avoid such resource curse pitfalls because of its ability to invest in human capital through education (when compared to its neighbors and counterparts)—despite the fact that 80% of its export wealth comes from natural resources (2007, 13). However, Iimi also predicts that Botswana’s exports are not sustainable and do not provide enough employment opportunities (2007 14; 2009, 2).

The resource curse has been a very controversial topic throughout the world. It can be explained through a myriad of causes—Dutch disease, a lack of economic diversity, government corruption and a lack of accountability, rent seeking, loose economic policies, and a lack of investment in human capitol. Each cross country case of the resource curse varies, and many countries suffer from a combination of these ailments. However, Botswana has mainly been able to avoid the resource curse because of it traditional institutions.

Variables and Data Sources

The dependant variable I focused on is economic growth and prosperity. In this study, economic growth is defined as average percent growth in Botswana’s annual GDP. This data was calculated by averaging the percent growth in GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dating from the years 1995 to 2008. Economic growth was then measured as simply the gross domestic product for countries in the year 2008. I chose to use the year 2008 as opposed to 2009 in order to control for the current economic downturn and recession. Lastly, economic growth was defined as per capita gross domestic product.

I used an already existing index to measure corruption. Corruption was defined by the values Transparency International provides annually through the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). This index ranks and rates a nation’s level of government corruption as perceived by citizens. Transparency International surveys citizens in order to discover how corrupt the public sector and government is throughout their nation. More than one survey is administered in order to deter false positives. Higher scores are presented to the least corrupt states on a rating scale that ranges from one to ten. Botswana is ranked highest among African nations with a CPI ranking of 37 (world-wide) and score or 5.60 (Transparency International). In this study, CPI is one of many independent variables. The Corruption Perception Indices of the countries provided were then correlated against average percent growth in GDP (1995-2008), GDP figures for the year 2008, and lastly, per capita GDP in the year 2008.

In order to operationalize investment in human capital, I chose to focus on national investment in education. In Birdsall’s study, investment in human capital was defined through enrollment in secondary education. Instead of following the same pattern, I sought to define investment in education as expenditures per student as a percentage of per capita GDP. This data was taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. This was done to directly measure educational investments by country. Data was only provided for years ranging from 2000 to 2009. The figures were then averaged spanning this time period. However, not all data values were given for this particular data set, and not all countries were listed. As a result, the values provided for each year were simply averaged in order to produce an estimated value that could to be used for the correlation. This figure was then correlated against average percent growth in GDP. The same was done for expenditures per student as a percentage of per capita GDP for secondary and tertiary education. In all, one-hundred-twenty-six countries were studied for both primary and secondary education. Only one-hundred-eleven countries were studied for tertiary education investment because there was a limited amount of information available (Data Table 1, and Data Table 2).

Lastly, qualitative data was used to compare Botswana’s economic policies, diamond resources, and colonial history against Sierra Leone’s. Specifically, the economic policies considered were corporate tax rates, foreign exchange controls, and foreign ownership of companies. Qualitative data was also used to compare Botswana and Sierra Leone’s diamonds industries—alluvial versus non-alluvial diamonds, and their effects on corruption and the economic growth of these nations.

Botswana and Sierra Leone were compared because they have many similar characteristics. Both nations’ economies depend on natural resource exports—diamonds. Both countries are considered sub-Saharan countries with a history of European colonization. Both countries were originally protectorates of Great Britain, and then became independent within four years of one another. The areas in which these countries differ are depth of corruption and political instability, length of colonial rule, economic policies, and type of diamond resource (alluvial diamonds versus non-alluvial diamonds). They also differ in geographic location. Sierra Leone is located on the northwest coast of Africa, while Botswana is a completely landlocked nation deep in southern Africa.

Data Analysis

The best way to define the findings of this research is mixed. When correlating Average percent growth in GDP and investment in primary education, I found that there is a moderate negative correlation of -.360 and a significance level of .000 which means that countries that do not heavily invest in primary education tend to have more substantial economic growth. When comparing Botswana to the world average investment in primary education, it was found that Botswana invests at a lower amount of 13.79 percent of per capita GDP per student, versus the world average of 15.19 percent. The data show that Botswana follows the successful economic trend of not investing in primary education. Therefore the alternative hypothesis which proposed that Botswana is able to grow economically because of its ability to follow the primary education investment trend is accepted (Figure 2). The reason primary education investment may hinder economic growth could be due to infant and youth mortality across the globe. Citizens in many countries suffer from disease, malnutrition, civil conflict, and early education drop out rates. These countries may find it more logical to invest in children who will survive to the levels of secondary and tertiary education. In contrast, countries that invest more in individuals who make it to their sixteenth birthday are more likely to receive returns from their educational investment as they are those countries in which the above conditions do not exist. Depressing as it may seem, this is a possibility why a moderate and negative correlation was discovered between investment in primary education and economic growth.

No correlation was found between secondary and tertiary education. The calculated Pearson’s R for secondary education is -.154, with a significance level of .090. As a result, we reject the alternative hypothesis that Botswana has been able to grow economically as a result of its above average investment in education (39.27 percent of per capita GDP per student versus the world average of 21.67 percent). With regards to tertiary education, an extremely weak correlation coefficient of .022 was calculated, with a significance level .820—making the data exceptionally insignificant. Since no correlation was found, the alternative hypothesis that Botswana has been able to grow economically because of its heavy investment in tertiary education in comparison to the world is rejected (449.61 percent of per capita GDP per student versus the world average of 107.43) (Figure 3 and Figure 4).

In examining the effects of corruption on economic growth, average percent growth in GDP was correlated against the Corruption Perception Index for one-hundred-twenty-five countries spanning the years from 1986 to 2008. The correlation coefficient calculated was -.042 and the significance level was calculated to be .640—making this correlation extremely insignificant (Figure 5). However, I ran additional tests because I felt that there should be a strong correlation between corruption and economic growth as previously mentioned by scholars. I also believed that average percent growth in GDP was not a good indicator of economic prosperity because some of the wealthiest countries in the world do not grow by larger percentages per annum. Take for example the United States of America, which boasts the world’s largest gross domestic product of 14.6 trillion. The U.S. only grew a mere .4 percent in 2008. In contrast, countries like Bhutan, with a 1.28 billion dollar GDP, reported a staggering 13.8 percent growth in GDP in 2008 (World Bank). This phenomenon occurs because the wealthiest countries have simply leveled off with regards to growth. Their economies have hit all time highs and are unlikely to grow too much more in the near future because they have already reached maturity. In contrast, infant economies like Bhutan will continue to grow at incredible rates until they reach their maximum capacity based upon country size, industry, and population.

This phenomenon can be compared to newborn children. Infants grow at the highest rates in the first few months of their lives. Their bodies still continue to grow even after adulthood, but at much smaller rates. Likewise, economies also continue to grow past their optimal (or maximum) maturation levels. However they only grow at low levels. Much of this growth is also negligible because it is counterbalanced by other economic factors such as population growth and increased inflation. The phenomenon can also be likened to that of tomato plants, which grow rapidly from the base in the first few weeks after sprouting. However, tomato plants do not continue to grow to the size of redwood trees -they eventually taper off. Tomato plants still continue to grow buds and produce tomatoes to replace the harvested produce (similar to how economic growth accounts for inflation and population growth), but they do not continue to grow at high rates.

To account for this I first correlated the corruption perception index simply against gross domestic product for all nations with available data for the year 2008. Standard GDP is a much better indicator of economic prosperity because it is simply the size of a nation’s economy, as opposed to growth which varies among infant and mature economies (where young or small economies have a tendency to grow a much fast rates as they catch up to the rest of the developed world). The Pearson’s R for this regression was a fairly moderate .295 with a significance level of .000. This meant that although the correlation was not tremendously strong, the data was certainly significant (Figure 6).

Once again I chose to revise the correlation because I felt that it was not the best indicator of economic and financial prowess. The problem with using pure gross domestic product to measure economic prosperity is that it does not account for additional variables like country size, labor force, and population. In order to account for these additional variables I correlated the Corruption Perception Index one final time—this last time against per capita GDP. When surveying one-hundred-sixty-two countries a correlation coefficient of .810 was calculated with a significance of .000. Therefore the data found that there was an extremely strong correlation between per capita GDP and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. This data is also tremendously significant because of the large sample size (n). Therefore the alternative hypothesis that there is a correlation between state corruption and economic growth and strength is accepted (Figure 7).

In analyzing this data we find that the least corrupt nations are the most prosperous. This trend is in compliance with Botswana high CPI of 5.6—making it the least corrupt nation in Africa (even less corrupt than South Africa). When comparing this rating to Sierra Leone, I found that Botswana’s high CPI was more than double Sierra Leone’s score of 2.2. In comparing these two nations I also found that corruption deters economic growth as exhibited by Botswana and Sierra Leone’s GDP Trends (Corruption Perception Index).

The next question asked was, “What, if any, additional economic policies has Botswana been able to implement in order to bolster economic growth?” When examining Botswana’s economic policies I found that its policies have promoted economic growth. Take for example corporate tax rates. Botswana’s corporate tax rate is a low fifteen percent in comparison to many countries that charge anywhere between twenty-five and nearly forty percent. When comparing Botswana’s corporate tax rate to Sierra Leone’s, I found that Sierra Leone levies double – a thirty percent corporate tax. These high corporate tax rates deter foreign direct investment inflows. Many companies will choose to avoid investing in foreign countries where corporate tax rates are relatively high in order to maximize profits. Botswana has also been able to encourage foreign investment by allow for foreign ownership. Also, Botswana has promoted foreign investment by eliminating foreign exchange controls and government controls on foreign currency. These controls also deter investors by setting currency exchange rates and limiting use of foreign currency with a country. Doing so aggravates international trade and investment by stymieing investors’ ease of transactions. Since Botswana has one of the freest economies, it has been ranked by both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s as one of the best investment opportunities in the developing world (Background note: Botswana and Background note: Sierra Leone).

Perhaps one of the most eye-opening pheromones observed when comparing Botswana and Sierra Leone is their difference in colonial history. Sierra Leone’s history has been mired by a lengthy record of colonial activity beginning in 1462 with the arrival of Spanish settlers seeking new slaves, to 1787 with the returning of repatriated and freed slaves to the province of Freetown by Great Britain. The state remained a British protectorate until it gained independence in 1961. However, even after independence Sierra Leone suffered from political instability and civil war that has lead to coup after coup until 2002. All in all, Sierra Leone remained under the influence of western powers for 174 years. In contrast, Botswana lived under European rule for a relatively less significant 81 (Timeline: Sierra Leone, Timeline: Botswana).

When comparing the country’s colonial history, we also find that Botswana’s story has been less violent than that of Sierra Leone. The nation has had institutionally engrained democratic traditions dating back to its tribal history—long before western colonization. Specifically, the Botswana institution of “Kgotla” has allowed for political transparency and legitimacy. This institution calls for “the public legitimization of decisions” (Morton et. al. 2008, 170). Under this institution all tribe members have a say in decision making and are allowed to speak for or against tribal verdicts. These democratic principles have allowed Botswana to remain transparent and avoid corruption, which has in turn allowed for economic prosperity as exemplified by the above data (Morton et. al. 2008, 170).

Botswana’s democratic principles have partially led to its political stability, as they have proven to be extremely important for economic growth. Outside foreign proprietors will be deterred to invest in a nation where little stability exists because doing so would be financially risky. Instead, investors want to be able to invest their money with confidence—knowing that their venture will not be hurt by outside factors pertaining to the county in which they hold a vested interest. A proprietor will be slow to flow money into a nation mired by civil war because he will be less likely to turn a profit as a result of the conflict. Why would the investor risk returns in a conflict bearing state when he could simply spend money in a safer country?           Therefore, investors are more likely to invest in countries where there will be a guaranteed labor force that can safely travel to and from work, where they can guarantee that they will be able to transport their goods without inhibition, and where there is a secure policing force to protect their investment. This idea is illustrated through foreign direct investment. In 2008 Botswana received inflows amounting to one-hundred-nine million dollars in foreign direct investment. In contrast, Sierra Leone experienced a foreign direct investment inflow deficient of -3.41 million (World Bank Foreign direct investment inflows).

The last element of corruption I examined was the type of diamond resource that is present in Botswana versus Sierra Leone. Alluvial diamonds, which Sierra Leone harvests, are diamonds that are gathered via panning. As a result, prospectors can simply pan for diamonds with little investment. They will not incur the fixed costs of the heavy machinery and equipment needed for laborious diamond mining. In contrast, much of Botswana’s diamond resources must be mined. Therefore those who wish to mine Botswana’s diamonds must invest a large amount of money in order to collect diamond profits. The difference here is economies of scale, or heavy investment, versus low investment harvesting. Since Sierra Leone’s diamonds can be harvested with little investment costs, their diamond industry is much more difficult to regulate and tax. As a result, their alluvial diamonds are more likely to be leaked into the black market, and can be used to fund corrupt regimes and civil wars. In contrast, Botswana’s diamonds require high investment costs which deter illegitimate markets from pursuing them. These diamonds are also difficult to harvest without property rights, since diamond mining requires long term labor (Bannon and Collier 2003, 4-6). In contrast, panning, even via trespassing, can be worked around through bribery, and other illicit activities (Figure 8).

Conclusion

The implications of this research are as follows. First, it can be asserted that not all resource rich countries suffer from declining economies. In doing so, Botswana can be admired as not only an outlier to this trend, but also as an example and enabler to other nations who suffer from economic calamity. By recognizing Botswana’s areas of strength, other nations are able to follow in Botswana’s footsteps—especially with regards to economic practices, and, ultimately, rebound. In addition, we can also assert the importance of government legitimacy when examining economic stability, in hopes of one day successfully implementing government reform through transparency and sparking social change. In other words, countries that are suffering economically should be encouraged to oust corrupt practices in hopes of gaining economic stability.

In completion of this research, the data shows that there is a strong correlation between state corruption and economic growth or prosperity. Botswana has been able to grow economically because of its ability to remain transparent and democratic. This is especially true when comparing Botswana to Sierra Leone, who has had a difficult time growing fiscally as a result of its history of corruption, and civil conflict. We can also conclude that Botswana has direct investment inflows. Lastly, in examination of Botswana’s diamond resources the data proves that Botswana’s non-alluvial diamond industry has allowed it to evade the black market diamond transactions that once funded civil conflict in Sierra Leone (Timeline: Sierra Leone).

This research illustrates that the resource curse can be explained through state corruption, economic policies, and diamond resource type—where resources that can be regulated are least vulnerable to corruption, and most conducive toward economic prosperity. With respect to investment in education, the data shows that low investment in primary education is beneficial to economies. However, there is no correlation between investment in secondary and tertiary education. Additional research would further examine secondary and tertiary education investment by changing the regression from average percent growth in GDP versus expenditures per student as a percent of per capita GDP (for primary, secondary, and tertiary education) to per capita GDP versus expenditures per student as a percent of per capita GDP. This would be a better indicator of economic strength and growth because it accounts for additional variables like country size (this was only done for per capita GDP versus CPI when correlating economic growth versus corruption). However, even if a correlation is discovered it may be considered specious because wealthier countries, by definition, are simply more likely to have resources in which they can invest. Therefore, correlation does not necessarily mean causation.

Further research pertaining to investment in human capital would measure investment in technological innovation. This could be operationalized by running a regression between per capita GDP and public or government allocations with respect to research based grants, financial aid or scholarship to students pursuing undergraduate and graduate degrees, or even aerospace, military, and computer technology. Again, this data could also be considered erroneous for the same reasons a correlation between educational investment and per capita gross domestic product may be considered flawed.

In addition, testing the resource curse versus corruption could be augmented if an index relating to natural resource dependence existed. Since no index does exist at this time, I was not able to run a test to examine natural resource dependence versus the Corruption Perception Index. Doing so would directly examine whether resource rich countries are more prone to corruption—thus bolstering the argument that declining economies are more linked to government and public sector corruption.

Since qualitative data was used to examine the economic policies of countries and their effects on economic development, further research would entail studying additional natural resource rich countries through qualitative data. Doing so would bolster the argument that there is a correlation between the specific economic policies previously mentioned and economic strength. This would be accomplished by correlating federal direct investment inflows against corporate tax rates. The Corruption Perception Index could also be used to correlate federal direct investment inflows against corruption in order to discover whether or not corruption deters foreign cash inflow as a result of political instability.

Ultimately we conclude that countries can successfully avoid the resource course by reversing government corruption and embracing economic policy reform.

Works Cited

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By: Jesse Hubbard

Abstract:

This paper examines hegemonic stability theory, the concept in international relations that an assertive hegemon can act as a stabilizing force in the international system. Through a quantitative analysis looking at both American and British hegemonic governance, it was discovered that in both cases there is a strong negative association between the hegemon’s relative power and levels of military conflict in the international system. However, higher levels of engagement in conflict by the hegemon are also associated wit higher levels of conflict in the international system, and military power is a weaker predictor of conflict levels than economic power. This has a number of potential implications, the most notable of which is that hegemons may be more effective in promoting peace through economic power than through the exercise of military force.

I. Introduction

In his magnum opus The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon wrote admiringly of the benefits of the Pax Romana. It was the “period in the history of the world” wrote Gibbon, “during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous” (Gibbon 1776). Ever since Gibbon, the idea of an imperial peace has permeated the intellectual discourse. In the 19^th century, apologists for Britain’s colonial empire spoke of a Pax Britannica spreading peace and progress throughout the world. In our own time, it is the term Pax Americana that is used to describe the relative peace that has permeated the international system since the end of World War II. In international relations, this idea of an imperial peace has been honed into a more precise concept known as hegemonic stability theory.

The field of international relations is replete with contentious debates over both theory and policy, but hegemonic stability theory has elicited controversy from theoreticians and policymakers alike. Hegemonic stability theory posits that an assertive hegemon can act as a stabilizing force in the international system. While the theory itself may be straightforward, it has complex ramifications for the nature of order in the international system.  The theory also holds important consequences regarding the morality of hegemony itself. If hegemony does indeed produce such beneficial effects for the world, then hegemonic stability theory lends moral weight to the hegemon.

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system.

Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. I then matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts in the international system since 1815. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. Regression analysis of the data revealed that there was a statistically significant negative correlation between relative hegemonic power and conflict levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further analysis revealed that in both cases, military power was a less accurate predictor of military conflict than economic power. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the most important implication of this research is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power than through the exercise of military force.

II. Research Question

In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor.

Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the hegemon acted as a stabilizing force by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. It also avoids some of the pitfalls associated with the case study method, such as selection bias and the inherently subjective nature of qualitative analysis.

III. Literature Review

Hegemonic stability theory is one of the most influential yet controversial ideas to emerge from the field of international relations. Because the subject is of obvious relevance to the role of the United States in the world, the debate over hegemonic stability theory is consequential for academics and policymakers alike. Since the theory’s genesis in the 1970s, a substantial body of literature has emerged critiquing and expanding upon the original idea. A review of the literature reveals that hegemonic stability theory has been analyzed quite thoroughly from an economic perspective. It also reveals a potential for more research to be done examining the effect of hegemony on armed conflict in the international system.

The origins of hegemonic stability theory can be traced back to the 1950s, when Organski postulated that there was a link between British hegemony and the rise of free trade in the 19^th century (Organski 1958).  In 1973, Charles Kindleberger proposed the first true iteration of hegemonic stability theory when he argued that economic disorder in the years between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the lack of a hegemon (Kindleberger 1973). Kindleberger’s analysis raised some interesting questions for further study. Namely, to what extent was his analysis applicable to other historical epochs? Is the stabilizing effect created by hegemony quantifiable? And, perhaps most intriguingly, does this stabilizing effect extend beyond the realm of economics?

The scholarship of Robert Gilpin was instrumental in fleshing out hegemonic governance as a broader theoretical concept. In his 1981 work War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin argued that instability in the international system is inversely related to the extent of a hegemon’s relative economic and military capabilities (Gilpin 1983). However, Gilpin’s analysis has not gone unchallenged. David Lake argues that Gilpin overestimates the centrality of hegemony to international order (Lake 1993). While he believes that hegemonic stability theory still has important insights, it should not necessarily be regarded as the central stabilizing factor in the international system. The work of Kindleberger and Gilpin divided hegemonic stability theory into two distinct approaches – Kindleberger, as a liberal economist, focused primarily on the role of the hegemon in providing collective goods contributing to economic stability. Gilpin, on the other hand, focuses much more on the security implications of hegemonic governance.

A number of scholars of international relations have followed Kindleberger’s approach. Among the most influential work in this area was done by Keohane, Deudney, and Ikenberry. In his seminal text After Hegemony, Keohane argues that despite the relative decline of the United States, economic stability has endured because of the strength of the institutions the US helped create (Keohane 1984). Deudney and Ikenberry expanded upon this analysis, arguing that hegemony alone cannot account for the current stability in the international system (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). Rather, it is just one among a number of factors contributing to stability. Co-binding security institutions, economic openness, and civic identity are among the other factors of importance in fostering stability. The arguments of Deudney and Ikenberry are persuasive, but would be served by greater empirical rigor.

Fortunately, other authors have stepped forward with their own more empirical research. In The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, Duncan Snidal uses the tools of game theory to argue that cooperation does not necessarily decline with a hegemon’s decline – it can even be enhanced under some conditions (Snidal 1985). Snidal’s analysis is useful for demonstrating the logical feasibility of Keohane’s, Deudney’s and Ikenberry’s arguments, even if his numerical models are ultimately somewhat arbitrary. And while the works of Deudney, Ikenberry, and Keohane are very important, they basically follow Kindleberger’s path in their focus on international economics. It is also worth devoting a good deal of attention to the more security-focused studies of hegemonic stability theory that have been done.

Compared to the amount of scholarship focusing on the economic aspects of hegemonic stability theory, there is a relative dearth of research focusing on security implications, especially from an empirical perspective. This is an area where there is clearly room for new research. A number of scholars have challenged Gilpin’s thesis that instability in the international system is inversely related to the extent of a hegemon’s relative economic and military capabilities, but few have empirically tested it. Spiezio performed one of the few test cases in his analysis of British hegemony from 1815 to 1939 (Spiezio 1990). He chose Britain because it provides the only example of a complete hegemonic cycle for which reliable data are available.

Webb and Krasner wrote in Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment that one of the major challenges confronting researchers is in defining what constitutes hegemony (Webb and Krasner,1989). By examining Britain’s relative power year-by-year rather than simply measuring the amount of conflict during British hegemony, Spiezio circumvents this problem. Relying on the Correlates of War data set, he found that incidence of major war was inversely related to magnitude of hegemonic power, defined as a combination of military and economic capacity as a proportion of total capacity in the international system. The results also indicated that British hegemony was not the most important factor creating variation in the levels of international conflict. Another surprising anomaly was that hegemony appeared to account for more variation in frequency of all wars than in great power wars. Furthermore, Spiezio noticed a spike in conflict in the years when Britain was near its peak in terms of relative power. Thus, while Spiezio’s work provided support Gilpin’s basic hypothesis, it also called into question the centrality of hegemony in fostering stability. Spiezio’s research, while very useful, left a lot of room for further analysis. For instance, what would a similar empirical test reveal about United States dominance?

A similar, though not identical, empirical test was done by Volgy and Imwalle examining the correlation between the power of the United States and international conflict (Volgy and Imwalle 2000). Like Spiezio, Volgy and Imwalle used the data set provided by the Correlates of War project. Also like Spiezio, Volgy and Imwalle operationalize power by finding the share of US economic and military output as a proportion of the military and economic output of all major nations in the international system. The study, which examined US power from 1950 to 1992, found a statistically significant negative correlation between the relative strength of the United States and incidence of international conflict and terrorism. An interesting follow-up to Volgy and Imwalle’s research would be to expand the data set to the years after 1992. Since almost all the data in the original study was from the Cold War era, adding more data from the unipolar era would be a valuable exercise. The work of Spiezio and Volgy and Imwalle has been invaluable for providing more rigorous empirical analysis of Gilpin’s thesis.        However, despite the advances made by their research, there is still far more analysis that can be done to test the robustness of hegemonic stability theory. While existing research has been useful in proving correlations between hegemony and stability, demonstrating causation has proven to be more elusive. Given the complexity of the international system, this is understandable. However, the work of Spiezio, Volgy, and Imwalle presents some opportunities to look at causal mechanisms in some specific instances. For example, Spiezio identified an increase in conflict during Britain’s peak power years. Further research examining Britain’s role in the major international conflicts of this period could prove to be a worthwhile addition to the literature.

Hegemonic stability theory has produced its fair share of scholarship in the years since Kindleberger’s research of the interwar period. While most of the literature has focused on hegemony’s effects on international economic relations, the work of Gilpin has led to some serious scholarship on hegemony’s effects on international security. Studies like those of Spiezio have been particularly valuable in advancing scholars’ understanding of the theory’s relevance to international security. Further research building on these quantitative studies would represent a meaningful contribution to the literature on hegemonic stability theory. A more thorough understanding of the effects of hegemony on international security would have implications far beyond the ivory tower. Studying the link between hegemony and violence has the potential to affect the practice as well as the theory of international relations.

IV. Variables and Data Sources

Broadly speaking, my hypothesis addresses two distinct questions. The first question is whether there is in fact, as Gilpin posited, an inverse relationship between the strength of the hegemon and the level of conflict in the international system. The second question I address is whether there is an inverse relationship between the quantity of military force used by the hegemon and the level of conflict in the international system. I study both of these questions using the test cases of British and American hegemony. Like Gilpin, I define British hegemony as encompassing the period from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the outbreak of World War II. Excluded from this analysis are the years 1915-1919, due to some highly suspect anomalies in the data regarding composite index of national capability. The American hegemonic period encompasses the years since the end of World War II until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. Determining the exact start and end dates of hegemony is something of a subjective enterprise. These dates were chosen because they seem to be the most commonly used in the existing literature, but finding a perfect start and end date is inherently controversial.

Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables is a challenge of critical importance to the project. To determine the strength of the hegemon, I use the Composite Index of National Capability published by the Correlates of War Project. The Composite Index of National Capability is a statistical measure of national power that averages six different dimensions of relative strength to produce a single number between 0 and 1. Each dimension is weighted equally. A state with all the power in the international system would receive a CINC score of 1, whereas a state with absolutely no power in any dimension would receive a 0. For many years, international relations scholars were forced to rely on crude measures like GDP to gauge national strength. The Composite Index of National Capability is an improvement over these one-dimensional measures because it measures three different categories of power: economic, demographic, and military. While GDP may be acceptable as a measure of potential power, it does not reveal much about many important aspects of hegemony, such as a state’s capacity to undertake military action.

Economic power is measured through the iron and steel production ratio and the primary energy consumption ratio. The iron and steel production ratio measures the nation’s iron and steel production in kilotons in a given year against the total amount produced in the world in that year. Since iron and steel are the primary products of blast furnaces, they are one of the best proxies for overall industrial strength that exists in a quantifiable form. The primary energy consumption ratio measures a nation’s energy consumption in a given year compared to total energy consumption in the world in that year. Energy consumption can take many forms, from electricity to gasoline to coal burning. The Correlates of War project converts all types of energy production into kilotons of coal equivalent. For example, if a nation consumed 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas, the energy represented by this gas would be represented in kilotons of coal. This makes it compile a single ratio that takes into account all energy types. Relative energy consumption is a useful gauge of economic capacity since it measures a quantitative commodity that can be compared from state-to-state and year-to-year.          Demographic strength in the Composite Index of National Capability is measured using the total population ratio and the urban population ratio. The total population ratio measures the population of the state in question against the population of the world in a given year. There are several advantages a state with a larger population has in the international system. From a military standpoint, such a state can suffer greater losses during a time of war and can experience less acute labor shortages on the home front during such times. But simply measuring the number of people in a state fails to capture some of the more subtle benefits accrued by population. The Correlates of War project thus looks at urban populations for a more complete view, since they are “associated with higher education standards and life expectancies, with industrialization and industrial capacity, and with the concentrated availability of citizens who may be mobilized during times of conflict.” To count as an urban population, a city must have a population of at least 100,000 people. Of course, it is impossible to come up with completely objective definition of urban. Especially in the first part of the 19^th century, many smaller cities could be unfairly discounted by this definition. However, the purpose of the urban population index is not to compare cities from different decades or centuries – its role is as a relative measure within a given year.

Any analysis of hegemonic power would not be complete without a measure of military strength. Military strength in the Composite Index of National Capability is measured through the military expenditures ratio and the military personnel ratio. For purposes of the index, military personnel are defined as soldiers under the control of the federal government, meant for use against foreign enemies. Military police and reserves, for instance, are not counted in the total. Military expenditures are defined as the military budget for a given state in a given year. Rather than look at official military budgets, which can be unreliable, the Correlates of War Project focuses on what constitutes true military spending. For example, pension to veterans and war widows are excluded from the calculations, even if they were included in the state’s official military budget.

My dependent variable, level of conflict, is also measured using data from the Correlates of War Project. Previous quantitative analyses of hegemony, such as that done by Spiezio in the 1980’s, examined only incidence of major power war. Unfortunately, this means that there are long “dry spells” in the data in which there are zero major power wars. At other points, the data contains only one or two major power conflicts during any given period. For statistical purposes, these data are less than ideal. By looking at frequency of military conflict, I avoided this statistical conundrum. The Correlates of War Project defines conflict as threat, display, or use of military force short of war. As an example of what constitutes such an institute, here is the Project’s summary of one dispute in 1997:

USA patrol boats stopped and detained two Russian tankers suspected of carrying

sanctioned Iraq oil from the Persian Gulf. Russian Foreign Minister demanded the

immediate release of the tanker (“Dispute Narratives” 2004).

Their database catalogues over 2,000 interstate militarized disputes in the years since 1815. Thus, it is a far less crude way of quantifying conflict in the international system. It also increases the reliability of quantitative analysis of hegemonic stability.

To operationalize my second independent variable, use of military force by the hegemon, I simply extracted every incident where the hegemon used military force from the Correlates of War conflict data set. In other words, I took each instance of conflict in which the hegemon was a party and plotted it against the total amount of conflict in a given five-year period.

To analyze these data, regression analysis is an appropriate tool. Using ordinary least-squared regression, I determined whether a linear relationship existed between the strength of the hegemon and the level of conflict in the international system. I also used regression analysis to determine the relationship between quantity of military force used by the hegemon and the level of conflict in the international system.

There are some shortcomings to the approach presented above. None of the measures of national power that make up the Composite Index of National Capability are completely flawless. Particularly in the early years, data may not be as precise as would be ideal. Additionally, the index does not account for some of the more subtle psychological and political aspects of power. However, this is a problem inherent in doing quantitative analysis. It is impossible to measure intangible factors using hard numbers. The Composite Index of National Capability is a good way to measure a concept that is very difficult to quantify. The results of my statistical analysis should not be looked at as laws of international relations. The analysis should be valued for the questions it raises rather than the tentative answers it provides.

V.  Data Analysis

The statistical tests performed resulted in some potentially interesting findings. The first set of data analyzed was the data on British hegemonic strength in comparison to armed conflict. As can be seen in the table below, British hegemonic strength is relatively high at the outset of the period covered, then begins a gradual decline in the later part of the century. By the 1930’s, Britain’s relative power is far lower than it was even at the outset of the hegemonic period. Correspondingly, international conflict is also higher in the final decades of focus than at any other time during the period of British hegemony. A graph of the relationship between the two variables puts this relationship into a visual context:

Years Covered Conflicts     CINC

Subjectively, the data in the table and the graph look as if they support the hypothesis, and more rigorous statistical analysis confirms this. Regression analysis reveals that the Pearson’s r-value for this data is -.754, a very strong negative correlation. Additionally, the data is highly significant, with a p-value of less than .0001. One objection that was raised to these results during their presentation was that including the years after 1914 in the British hegemonic period is controversial. Indeed, a strong argument could be made to end the period classified as hegemony in 1914. When the years after 1914 are excluded from the data, the results are still very robust. The correlation coefficient using data from this time period is -.732, a value very close to that obtained from the entire data set. The p-value is slightly higher at .0002, but is still statistically significant by even the most rigorous measures. Clearly, there is a strong negative correlation between British hegemonic strength and violent conflict.

The next step was to determine if this relationship held true for the other period of hegemony captured by reliable data- that of United States hegemony. As can be seen in the table below, there are fewer data points to work with simply because there are fewer years of hegemony to work with. However, visually, the graph of this relationship looks quite similar to the one found for British hegemony:

Years Covered     CINC      Conflicts

Statistical analysis confirms that the relationship found for British hegemony also holds for American hegemony. In fact, Pearson’s r is -.819 for this data set – indicating an even stronger correlation than that found between British hegemonic strength and violent conflict. Probably due to the smaller data set, the p-value is .002, still well beyond the threshold of statistical significance, but higher than the values found for British hegemony. In both of these cases, a clear negative correlation can be established between hegemonic power and violent conflict; the next question I sought to answer was why this relationship exists.

The next logical step in terms of data analysis was to look at the relationship between the hegemon’s use of force and total force used in the international system. I had originally hypothesized that the relationship between the two variables would be negative, matching the results obtained regarding hegemonic power and conflict. However, this turned out not to be the case. As can be clearly seen in the table and graph below, there is actually quite a strong positive relationship between use of force by Britain and total force used in the international system:

Year                  Brit. Conf.  Tot. Conf.

Statistical analysis provides quantitative backing for this observation. The correlation coefficient is .772, a strong positive relationship. The data is also highly statistically significant, with a p-value of less than .0001. While the data is sound, it is also puzzling – despite the strong negative association between British strength and violent conflict, actual use of force by the hegemon was associated with higher levels of conflict. This result added new complexity to the research puzzle, but before drawing any conclusions, I decided it was advisable to apply the same test to American hegemony. The data presented in the table and graph below tells a similar story to that shown above, albeit with significantly fewer data points to work with:

Year  US Con. Tot. Con.

However, despite the smaller amount of data points, the relationship is still strong statistically, evincing a Pearson’s r-value of .617 – weaker than that found for British hegemony, yet noteworthy nonetheless. The p-value, at .043, is significant at the 5% but not the 1% level. Thus, although the data is not quite as strong, the results do confirm the puzzling results found for British hegemony.

These results, though interesting, did not conform to my prior expectations. The assumption that hegemons act as a calming force in the international system by using its military strength had been severely questioned. Searching to further elucidate the complicated picture of hegemony that was emerging, I broke down the Composite Index of National Capability into its component parts, separating out military strength from overall strength. In so doing, my objective was to try and determine what exactly it is about hegemonic strength that associates it so well with conflict levels. The results of this analysis were very interesting indeed. For both British and American hegemony, military spending was actually a much weaker correlate with military conflict in the international system than the overall measure of national capability. With even a cursory glance at the British data, it is apparent that this relationship is somewhat less robust:

Year         Mil Spending  Conflict

Statistical analysis confirms this impression: the correlation coefficient is -.245, still significant, but much less so than a measure that the overall measure of power. The weaker correlation does not necessarily mean that military strength has no value in predicting conflict, it just indicates that it is far from the complete picture. A similar story plays out when the data on American hegemony is analyzed:

Year            Military Spending  Conflict

Statistical analysis of this data reveals that Pearson’s r-value is lower than in the data that looks at total national capability, measuring in at -.511, in comparison to the r-value of -.819 found when comparing total American capability to violent conflict levels. In fact, the relationship is even more tenuous than this still fairly large r-value suggests; the p-value is .108, and thus these results are not even statistically significant. If it is not military strength that is producing the strong association between violent conflict and hegemonic power, than what is? Data analysis of economic strength provides a potential answer to this question.

Analysis of the economic data revealed a further surprise: the hegemon’s economic strength, measured in energy output, is a more accurate predictor of conflict level than military strength. In the case of Britain, the raw data looks similar to that for military strength:

Year          Econ Strength   Conflict

Statistical analysis shows that the relationship is actually stronger than the relationship found between conflict and military spending. Pearson’s r-value is -.7398, compared to the -.245 r-value found in the analysis of British military spending. This result added more nuance to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. When this analysis is applied to American economic power, a similar pattern emerges:

Regression analysis of this data shows that Pearson’s r-value is -.836. In the case of American hegemony, economic strength is a better predictor of violent conflict than even overall national power, which had an r-value of -.819. The data is also well within the realm of statistical significance, with a p-value of .0014. While the data for British hegemony was not as striking, the same overall pattern holds true in both cases. During both periods of hegemony, hegemonic strength was negatively related with violent conflict, and yet use of force by the hegemon was positively correlated with violent conflict in both cases. Finally, in both cases, economic power was more closely associated with conflict levels than military power. Statistical analysis created a more complicated picture of the hegemon’s role in fostering stability than initially anticipated.

VI. Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy

To elucidate some answers regarding the complexities my analysis unearthed, I turned first to the existing theoretical literature on hegemonic stability theory. The existing literature provides some potential frameworks for understanding these results. Since economic strength proved to be of such crucial importance, reexamining the literature that focuses on hegemonic stability theory’s economic implications was the logical first step. As explained above, the literature on hegemonic stability theory can be broadly divided into two camps – that which focuses on the international economic system, and that which focuses on armed conflict and instability. This research falls squarely into the second camp, but insights from the first camp are still of relevance. Even Kindleberger’s early work on this question is of relevance. Kindleberger posited that the economic instability between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the lack of an economic hegemon (Kindleberger 1973). But economic instability obviously has spillover effects into the international political arena. Keynes, writing after WWI, warned in his seminal tract The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Germany’s economic humiliation could have a radicalizing effect on the nation’s political culture (Keynes 1919). Given later events, his warning seems prescient.

In the years since the Second World War, however, the European continent has not relapsed into armed conflict. What was different after the second global conflagration? Crucially, the United States was in a far more powerful position than Britain was after WWI. As the tables above show, Britain’s economic strength after the First World War was about 13% of the total in strength in the international system. In contrast, the United States possessed about 53% of relative economic power in the international system in the years immediately following WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild Europe’s economic strength with billions of dollars in investment through the Marshall Plan, assistance that was never available to the defeated powers after the First World War (Kindleberger 1973). The interwar years were also marked by a series of debilitating trade wars that likely worsened the Great Depression (Ibid.). In contrast, when Britain was more powerful, it was able to facilitate greater free trade, and after World War II, the United States played a leading role in creating institutions like the GATT that had an essential role in facilitating global trade (Organski 1958). The possibility that economic stability is an important factor in the overall security environment should not be discounted, especially given the results of my statistical analysis.

Another theory that could provide insight into the patterns observed in this research is that of preponderance of power. Gilpin theorized that when a state has the preponderance of power in the international system, rivals are more likely to resolve their disagreements without resorting to armed conflict (Gilpin 1983). The logic behind this claim is simple – it makes more sense to challenge a weaker hegemon than a stronger one. This simple yet powerful theory can help explain the puzzlingly strong positive correlation between military conflicts engaged in by the hegemon and conflict overall. It is not necessarily that military involvement by the hegemon instigates further conflict in the international system. Rather, this military involvement could be a function of the hegemon’s weaker position, which is the true cause of the higher levels of conflict in the international system. Additionally, it is important to note that military power is, in the long run, dependent on economic strength. Thus, it is possible that as hegemons lose relative economic power, other nations are tempted to challenge them even if their short-term military capabilities are still strong. This would help explain some of the variation found between the economic and military data.

The results of this analysis are of clear importance beyond the realm of theory. As the debate rages over the role of the United States in the world, hegemonic stability theory has some useful insights to bring to the table. What this research makes clear is that a strong hegemon can exert a positive influence on stability in the international system. However, this should not give policymakers a justification to engage in conflict or escalate military budgets purely for the sake of international stability. If anything, this research points to the central importance of economic influence in fostering international stability. To misconstrue these findings to justify anything else would be a grave error indeed. Hegemons may play a stabilizing role in the international system, but this role is complicated. It is economic strength, not military dominance that is the true test of hegemony. A weak state with a strong military is a paper tiger – it may appear fearsome, but it is vulnerable to even a short blast of wind.

Reference List

CARR, EDWARD HALLET. (1939) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Palgrave.

Correlates of War Datasets. Correlates of War Project, Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Datasets.htm. (Accesed March 19, 2010)

DEUDNEY, DANIEL., AND IKENBERRY, JOHN. (1999) Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order. Review of International Studies 25: 179-196. Available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=RIS&volumeId=25&issueId=02#. (Accessed February 9, 2010.)

GIBBON, EDWARD. (1776) The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. New York: Alfred A Knopf.

GILPIN, ROBERT. (1988) The Theory of Hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18: 591-613. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/204816. (Accessed February 9, 2010.)

GILPIN, ROBERT. (1983) War and Change in World Politics. Camdridge University Press. Available at http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=2iKL7zr3kl0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Hegemonic+Governance+Gilpin&ots=W-V1Ik4QVn&sig=Ma–Zvp473gE5Dk8IdVLrLdRQhI#v=onepage&q=Hegemonic%20Governance%20G(Accessed February 9, 2010.)

KEOHANE, ROBERT. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in The World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

KEOHANE, ROBERT. (1980) The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977. In Change in the Internationa System, edited by O. Holsti et al., pp. 131-62. Boulder, CO: Westview.

KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD. (1919) The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Project Gutenberg. Available at

http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/15776

(Accessed April 20, 2010)

KINDELBERGER, CHARLES. (1973). The World in Depression 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of California Press

LAKE, DAVID. (1984) Beneath the Commerce of Nations. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600693?seq=1. (Accessed February 10, 2010.)

LAKE, DAVID. (1993) Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: International Studies Quarterly, 37:  459-489. Accessed February 10, 2010, Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600841.

ORGANSKI, ABRAM FIMO KENNETH. (1958) World Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600841?seq=30. (Accessed February 13, 2010,)

SNIDAL, DUNCAN. (1985) The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory: International Organization, 39: 579-614. 2010, Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706716?seq=1. (Accessed February 9.)

SPIEZIO, EDWARD. (1990) British Hegemony and Major Power War: International Studies Quarterly, 34: 165-181, Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600707. (Accessed February 9, 2010)

VOLGY, THOMAS JAMES., AND IMWALLE, LAWRENCE E. (2000) Two faces of hegemonic strength: Structural versus relational capabilities – International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations. Available at http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a789388485&db=all. (Accessed February 15, 2010.).

WEBB, MICHAEL C., AND KRASNER, STEPHEN D. (1989) Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment : Review of International Studies, 15: 183-198. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097178?seq=2.

(Accessed February 9, 2010.)

By: Cat Baker

The presence of oil in Venezuela and the cooperation its past governments have fostered a strong U.S. interest in the nation over the course of the twentieth century.  With the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez, the United States grew increasingly concerned that its interests might be compromised.  Diplomatic relations between the two countries began to strain under the Bush administration as Chávez refused to allow the United States to continue antidrug over-flights in Venezuela and Washington analysts feared that Chávez might use oil shipments and prices as a weapon against the United States.1 Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution quickly transitioned from promoting political changes, such as a new constitution, to advocating social and economic policies that differed greatly from the neoliberal agendas proposed by the Washington Consensus.  The international community grew alarmed once petroleum production in Venezuela became nationalized and Chávez initiated agrarian reforms.2 President Bush responded by utilizing a program founded during the Reagan administration to prevent Chávez from becoming excessively authoritarian.  The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funded various organizations in Venezuela, all of which were in staunch opposition of Chávez.  By 2002, the year a coup temporarily removed Chávez from power, Venezuela had become the most heavily funded NED project in Latin America and the Caribbean, totaling $1,099,352 in grants.3 Allegations arose that the United States had indirectly assisted coup leaders through the NED’s funding to opposition parties.  Though the United States government has denied any participation, and State Department investigations have failed to provide any concrete evidence that Washington was involved in the coup, the amount of funding NED programs received leading up to the coup and the constant communication between Washington and coup conspirators has led many in the international community to question the true motives behind U.S. democratization efforts.

Many criticized Bush’s increased funding of NED programs in Venezuela at the beginning of his presidency, stating that Venezuela had become the first instance in which Bush distributed democracy aid to a nation that has historically granted its citizens numerous liberties and held its government accountable for its actions, especially in comparison to other countries in the region.4 Chávez has won two presidential elections by large percentages and even managed to defeat a midterm recall referendum by a margin of three-to-two.5 Various international observers, such the Carter Center, the European Union, and the Organization of American States have all stated that Venezuelan elections in recent years have been free and fair.

The NED expressed its concerns about changes passed by a constitutional assembly that gave the office of the executive more power than the legislative and judicial branches.6 The NED also opposed Chávez’s claim that presidential term limits should be lifted, publically questioning his commitment to democracy.  Despite criticisms, Chávez has taken steps toward forming a more participatory form of democracy that he believes will be superior to the representative form found in the United States.  The new constitution also includes “midterm recall referenda for all elected officials – including the president – and even an article that enshrines the right to civil disobedience if the regime should ‘contradict democratic values.’”7 Though increased checks and balances within the Venezuelan government may be necessary, the Bush administration funneled an unusually large sum of money into the coffers of Venezuelan organizations in an effort to promote a democracy that was already existent and functioning in the nation.

A significant increase in NED funding of Venezuelan opposition groups took place shortly after George Bush’s inauguration in January 2001 and the promotion of democracy soon became a higher ranked priority than ever before.  According to the U.S. State Department, “for FY 2002 in Venezuela, in the plan prepared in 2000, promoting democracy was ranked in fourth place.  In the FY 2003 plan, prepared in 2001, democracy moved to the highest priority.”8 The United States government proposed developing a strategy in order to strengthen existing democratic institutions and create new ones when necessary.  The U.S. wanted to engage members of Venezuelan society that had considerable power within the nation.  High-level Venezuelan officials, the armed forces, the police, members of the judicial system, the media, non-governmental organizations, academia, and those in the business sector were named as being the groups with which the U.S. would collaborate to promote change in Venezuela.9 Many of the people in the aforementioned groups openly opposed Chávez and represented the wealthier sectors of the nation.  The constant financial support provided to the opposition raised suspicions and much criticism from not only the Chávez administration, but also American scholars alike:
The Bush administration only supports groups who oppose Chávez.  These
organizations are given generous attention and accolades from the administration.

Bush has a credibility gap when claiming merely to be interested in advancing
democracy since he consistently backs the country’s opposition and fails to assist
Chavistas.10

The newfound commitment to democracy promotion in Venezuela manifested itself in generous grants to various organizations, with the totals of U.S. tax dollars invested into democracy promotion increasing exponentially each year after Bush’s inauguration.  NED funding in Venezuela increased from $257,831 to $877,435 between the years of 2000 and 2001.11 Between October 2001 and April 2002, NED grants in or involving Venezuela totaled $2,103,200.12 A variety of organizations received money from the U.S. government, with the largest allocations of funds going to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI).  The NDI and the IRI, respectively, are organizations affiliated with the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, and would later become heavily involved in organizing meetings with opposition leaders in the months leading up to the April 2002 coup d’état.  During the period between January 2001 and April 2002, the IRI received $340,000 in federal funds to develop political parties and also to strengthen the existing structures of parties.13 The grant also aimed to improve communication between parties, individual citizens, and the electorate as a whole.  The IRI received yet another grant of $300,000 from March 2002 until February 2003 that built upon its previous grants goals; however, the grant advocated the importance of political parties in a much more aggressive manner.  The State Department claimed that the second grant aimed to encourage parties to adopt concrete party platforms and communicate their ideologies to the electorate in a more effective manner.  Political parties received instructions to promote dialogue between themselves and the public in an effort to incorporate marginalized voters that were either unfamiliar with partisan politics or had thrown their support behind Chávez and denounced traditional Venezuelan parties.  Furthermore, the grant intended to enact reforms that would call for a more transparent and democratic selection of party leaders.14 The NDI received a lesser grant of $210,500 effective October 2001 until April 2002 that also strove to increase citizen participation in government.

The NED’s emphasis on strengthening political parties was intended to restore a more traditional political system popular in Venezuela during the pre-Chávez era and contrasts greatly with Chávez’s anti-party rhetoric that has helped bolster his popularity during recent years.  Before Chávez’s 1998 election, two parties dominated Venezuelan elections – Acción Democrática (AD) and the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI).  The two parties alternated control of the government for years, and the general public gradually became extremely disillusioned by alleged corruption.  Much of Chávez’s allure to the lower- and middle-classes revolved around his diatribe regarding the traditional political parties.  Chávez founded his own political party shortly before the 1998 presidential election named the Fifth Republic Movement.  Politically socialist, it later fused together with other Venezuelan parties that shared similar ideologies to form the United Socialist Party of Venezuela a decade later.  The aforementioned parties were not necessarily founded around a set of shared principles, but rather they focused on Chávez himself, as well as his agenda.  The NED and the Bush administration deemed the rise of the populist leader and the popularity of his persona to be forewarnings of increased authoritarian tendencies and heightened efforts to strengthen Venezuela’s failed political parties (which consisted of mostly anti-Chávez members).  The NED’s goals for democratization through funding inactive political parties therefore appeared to contrast greatly with the democratically elected president’s political strategy.15

The National Endowment for Democracy, through the International Republican Institute, worked tirelessly in the months leading up to the government overthrow to rebuild Venezuela’s failed party system and held numerous training sessions for opposition leaders that instructed them how to effectively garner political support and communicate with the electorate.  The IRI’s objective “was to provide a base from which these parties could spring back into the political sphere, with the ultimate goal of reassuming the national government”.16 Due to the nationalization of Venezuela’s oil by Chávez, the state gained an immeasurable amount of financial power and controlled a multi-billion dollar enterprise with vast reserves.  By funding political parties friendly to U.S. interests, Washington stood to gain from the removal of Chávez from power by a member of the opposition.  As early as 2001, the IRI office in Caracas established contacts with key opposition figures Francisco Arias Cárdenas, who was defeated by Chávez in the 2000 election, and with Caracas Mayor Alfredo Pena.17 Such relationships soon shifted from cordial meetings to active training by U.S. politicians in the ways of running a successful political campaign.  According to an IRI report, former Republican Party press secretary Mike Collins “conducted an IRI training session on communication strategies for Francisco Arias Cárdenas’s Unión Para el Progreso and encouraged the group to move its weekly press conferences out of its headquarters and into the streets.  The IRI also had discussions with [Pena] about possibly forming his own party.”18 Not only did Collins meet with Unión Para el Progreso, but AD, COPEI and Primero Justicia (an anti-Chávez party formed in the early 1990s) also attended the training session.  During a December 5 meeting between Collins and Pena, Collins advised Pena to try to shed his aggressive image in favor of a softer one that would appeal to more voters; he also consulted him in various ways in which could differentiate himself from Chávez and create a more positive image than that of the president.19

Though AD and COPEI have certainly benefitted from NED democratization efforts, no opposition party in Venezuela has gained more political influence in such a short period of time as Primero Justicia.  Formed in 1992 by young professionals with little to no political experience, the party has become the most popular and most outspoken opposition party in Venezuela thanks to NED and USAID funds.20 Primero Justicia’s relative youth in comparison to the nation’s more established political parties allowed the IRI to influence the group in ways it never would have been able to do with AD and COPEI.  The IRI provided a great deal of influence in terms of molding party leaders, determining party goals, and formulating strategies to execute its interests.  Primero Justicia members and leaders have played integral roles in attempts to destabilize the Venezuelan government throughout the duration of Chávez’s time in power and have utilized their IRI training to become a more refined and united opposing force – one that bears more resemblance to a U.S. political party than its Venezuelan counterparts did a decade ago.

A preponderance of evidence has surfaced since 2002 that exposes an escalated amount of interactions between U.S. government officials and known Chávez opposition members that took place in the immediate months preceding the coup.  The U.S. Embassy in Caracas and the State Department admit that they met frequently with organizations opposed to the Chávez government, but that such meetings are not uncommon diplomatic practice.21 When examining meetings between Venezuelan officials and U.S. diplomatic personnel, the State Department notes that it attempted to speak with both President Chávez and members of his administration, but that both parties rarely responded to their invitations.  Opposition groups had a greater proclivity to seek financial assistance from U.S. organizations as well as to discuss the status of democracy in Venezuela with Embassy Caracas officials.  Though the State Department claims that they also provided services to pro-Chávez groups, they refuse to name which organizations benefited from U.S. aid, generating criticisms from many observers that such groups never actually existed.22 The opposition groups that did meet with Embassy Caracas frequently expressed their desires to remove President Chávez from power through unconstitutional and undemocratic means, to which U.S. personnel rejected.  The State Department notes that these exchanges occurred orally, and that there is no written documentation to corroborate the extent to which the U.S. discouraged coup plotters.23

As political tensions intensified in February 2002, the IRI’s senior program officer for Latin America, Elizabeth Winger Echeverri, visited Venezuela and met with opposition parties working with the IRI.  That same month, U.S. embassy representatives met several times with the Federación Venezolana de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio Producción (Venezuela Federation of Chambers and Associations of Commerce and Production – FEDECAMARAS). Pedro Carmona, leader of FEDECAMARAS and the future interim president after Chávez’s removal from power, attended the meetings.  Following the conferences, the “IRI reported that it had ‘received firm commitment of party leaders to place a new, more urgent emphasis on the importance of party strengthening in the context of the present political turbulence.’”24 The IRI later sponsored a meeting with the same groups in Washington, DC in March.

In March, NED President Carl Gershman reiterated the Endowment’s classification of Chávez as an authoritarian leader in a speech made to the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.  Gershman made two recommendations for future NDI and IRI activism in Venezuela: “work to expand the constitutional, legal, and political space for civil society, NGOs, and opposition to political party development” and “focus on building up subcultures of democratic activism that try to achieve incremental gains, but that can also provide leadership if and when opportunities arise for more substantial breakthroughs.”25 Gershman’s statements, whether intentionally or not, foreshadowed the opportunity that was soon to arrive for the leaders of IRI partner groups to seize political power and replace the Chávez administration with members of the opposition movements.

Rumblings about a possible coup against President Chávez grew too loud for Washington to ignore by April 2002, and Embassy Caracas, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency were all made aware that anti-Chávez leaders would soon attempt to overthrow the president through unconstitutional means.  In an April 6, 2002 U.S. intelligence brief entitled “Conditions Ripening for Coup Attempt,” the CIA stated that both junior and senior members of the Venezuelan military were “stepping up efforts to organize a coup against President Chávez, possibly as early as this month…[deleted] The level of detail in the reported plans…[deleted] targets Chávez and 10 other senior offices for arrest.”26 The brief went on to accurately predict that coup conspirators may try to cause civil unrest at demonstrations to provoke military action later on in the month.  The CIA, therefore, knew that groups to which it had been channeling millions of dollars were going to act within the month to overthrow the democratically elected president, and yet it continued funding NED programs in the nation and did little to alert the Venezuelan government or offer it assistance so that democracy could be preserved in the nation.27 Not only did the CIA know that a coup was looming in the distance, but members of the U.S. government actively encouraged plotters to follow through with their plans. President Bush’s special envoy for Latin America, Otto Reich, met with Venezuelan generals in April, only days before the coup, to provide them with encouragement and support.  Once the coup took place, Reich remained in constant communication with several political actors within Venezuela.28

On April 11, opposition members launched their attack against President Chávez and Pedro Carmona, leader of FEDECAMARAS, became the temporary president through unconstitutional means.  Upon gaining power, Carmona dissolved parliament and the Supreme Court until Chávez’s return to power two days later.29 Within twenty-four hours, Venezuela had become more undemocratic than at any point under Chávez’s presidency.  The White House and the IRI initially praised the coup and its leaders, justifying it by stating that Chávez and his supporters allegedly opened fire on opposition demonstrators and that Chávez resigned from office later that day.30 State Department spokesperson Philip Recker remarked that the U.S. “looked forward to working with all democratic forces in Venezuela to ensure full exercise of democratic rights.  The essential elements of democracy, which have been weakened in recent months, must be restored fully.”31

Carmona’s abolishment of key democratic institutions within Venezuela alarmed the international community, and Washington faced much criticism for acknowledging Carmona as the rightful leader of a nation that was unraveling before the world’s eyes.  The State Department claims that it encouraged the interim government to hold elections promptly in order to legitimize the new leadership of the nation and also that it advised that the Carmona regime attempt to obtain approval by the Venezuelan National Assembly and the Supreme Court.32 The U.S. government’s hesitance to condemn the coup raised several eyebrows, especially within Venezuela and among Chávez supporters.  Washington refused to acknowledge the coup as antidemocratic, an odd oversight considering that in the six months preceding the coup, NED, the State Department, and the Department of Defense provided Venezuelan organizations and individuals with $3.3 million in training, institution building, and other support in an effort to further promote democracy within the nation.33 Though funding during the immediate months before the coup was substantially higher than some years’ total annual budgets, the State Department investigation into the matter could not prove that any of the U.S. assistance programs operating in Venezuela at the time directly contributed to the coup, even though Venezuelan groups receiving hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars in funding were active participants in the government overthrow.

The extent to which the Bush administration pumped money into opposition parties’ coffers in an effort to democratize an already democratic nation lacks political and economic logic, unless Washington was attempting to replace Chávez with a leader that would be more responsive to U.S. interests.  The United States, long known for its intervention in Latin America through undemocratic, and often violent, means almost successfully penetrated Venezuela’s political system through the $34,175,505 it invested into democracy promotion through NED and USAID programs from 2000-2006.34 An investigation by the State Department mandated by Congress failed to provide a paper trail in which U.S. involvement in the 2002 coup could be revealed, though the department itself admits that it could have done more to show the Venezuelan people that it did not support unconstitutional measures in regards to regime change.  The U.S. government also failed to warn Caracas that it knew the general details of how the coup would be organized and the approximate date when it would occur.  Increased meetings between opposition leaders and U.S. officials leading up to the coup could cause one to infer that the U.S. was far more aware as to what the plans of the coup organizers were than it should have known through normal circumstances.  That information, coupled with the sudden enlargement of funds donated to NED programs in Venezuela, portrays the U.S. government as secretly financing a coup under the guise of democracy promotion.  Washington’s reactions to the installation of Carmona as interim president certainly further that claim, since the United States did not condemn the uprising and hesitated to criticize Carmona’s consolidation of power in favor of the executive branch.  Whether or not it was the Bush administration’s explicit intent to forcibly remove Chávez from office, the startling amount of dollars invested into democracy promotion through NED programs ironically led to the temporary collapse of democracy in Venezuela until the popularly elected Chávez was restored to power.

2 Diane Raby. “Latin America’s Leftward Turn”. Global Dialogue. Vol. 10, (January 1, 2008): http://www.proquest.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/ (accessed March 13, 2010), 2

3 Scott Cole. “Hugo Chavez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap: The Struggle Against US Democracy Promotion” International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2007), 496

4 Ibid, 497

5 Phil Gunson. “Chávez’s Venezuela”. Current History, Vol. 105, No. 688, (February 1, 2006): http://www.proquest.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/ (accessed March 13, 2010), 58

6 Cole, 498

7 Gunson, 60

8 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General. “A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela November 2001 –  April 2002”. Report Number 02-OIG-003. (Washington, DC: GPO, July 2002), 11

9 Ibid

10 Cole, 499

11 Christopher I. Clement. “Confronting Hugo Chávez: United States ‘Democracy Promotion’ in Latin America.” Christopher I. Clement Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 32, No. 3, (2005): 69

12 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 28

13 Ibid

14 Ibid

15 Clement, 65-66

16 Eva Golinger. The Chávez Code. (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2006), 40.

17 Cole, 496

18 Clement, 70 and Golinger, 40

19 Clement, 70

20 Golinger, 41

21 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 2

22 Bart Jones. “U.S. funds aid Chávez opposition.” National Catholic Reporter. (April 2, 2004)

23 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 2

24 Clement, 70

25 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Operations. “Promoting Democracy in the Aftermath of September 11: A Statement by Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy to the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.” (Washington, DC: March 6, 2002)

26 Richard Gott. Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. (New York: Verso, 2005), 223

27 Ibid, 224 and Golinger, 61

28 Cole, 499

29 Gunson, 2

30 Clement, 70

31 Ibid

32 United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 1

33 Ibid, 19

34 Golinger, 56

By: Roxy Araghi

On Wednesday, January 20, American University hosted guest speakers Karim Sadjadpour and Afshin Molavi, two Iranian scholars who are researchers and analysts of Iranian society and government. The speakers covered several major topics stemming from Iran today – the June 12 elections and the opposition movement that formed in response, Iran’s future political and economic systems, and U.S.-Iranian. relations.

Afshin Molavi, a Fellow at the New America Institute who studies the relation between economic development and democratization, began the discussion by explaining the years leading up to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s first election in 2005, in which he ran against the mullah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who had previously held the presidential post. The outgoing president at the time was Mohammad Khatami, a reformist. It was noted that studies of Iranian politics must not only focus on the president, however, because he is not the only authority figure in the country; the Leader, currently Ayatollah Khamenei, and the Guardian Council, a twelve-member group comprised of six Islamic jurists and six jurists specializing in different areas of law, possess the greatest amount influence and control over Iranian government and politics.

Throughout President Khatami’s term as president, the state began its process of taking steps to limit the extent of his reformist proposals, as well as the ability of reformists in the Majles, Iran’s parliament, to put them into effect.  In 1999, there was a crackdown on reformist newspapers; one journalist told Molavi that, in Iran, there exists freedom of speech but not “freedom after speech.” The 2004 parliamentary elections were also censored, meaning that those who could run for office were “hand-picked” by having to demonstrate certain ideals for future policies. The extent of change that could be brought about by Khatami and his supporters in the Majles was therefore limited, and voters in 2005 looked to bring into office someone that they believed could be more effective.

Ahmadinejad, mayor of Tehran at the time of the 2005 elections, appealed to voters because of his populist approach; he was widely regarded as “a man of the people.” A state television report that visited Ahmadinejad’s house revealed a simple style of living without unnecessary frivolities, such as a sauna or expensive cars, luxury items the previous mayor of Tehran was known to have. Rafsanjani, on the other hand, was regarded as “The Millionaire Mullah” because of the great amount of wealth that he and his children possess. Voters turned to Ahmadinejad as someone with whom they could identify – a politician that would “rescue the common people from the mullahs.”

Although twenty million eligible voters, most of them from the middle class, did not participate in the 2005 elections, Ahmadinejad managed to garner enough support from those who did go to the polls. Throughout his four years as president, oil revenues in Iran were equal to the past 16 years combined, allowing Ahmadinejad’s administration to grant welfare benefits, handouts, and subsidies to the citizenry. These policies made Ahmadinejad extremely popular among the Iranian working class. However, his term in office also saw a 26% inflation rate and the declining potential of gas and oil reserves that the government depends on for revenue.

In 2009, some members of Iranian society were looking for a shift in policy – a hard prospect to realize in Iran because of a selective process that vets candidates of whom Ayatollah Khamenei and the Guardian Council disapprove. Candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohsen Rezaei were introduced as opposition candidates; most reformists supported either Mousavi or Karroubi. Others in Iran, however, sided with Ahmadinejad because of his social programs from which they benefited, as well as because of his closeness to Ayatollah Khomeini, whom they revere as a revolutionary figure.

In elections that opposition supporters claimed to be fraudulent, Ahmadinejad came away with the majority of the vote and was placed in office. This outcome sparked protests by the opposition in several Iranian cities; the majority of these protests, however, took place in Tehran, Iran’s capital city. Cries of “Where is my vote?” rang out in the streets, and the government eventually agreed to a partial recount to please the protestors. Once again, Ahmadinejad emerged successful and the government felt satisfied enough to inaugurate him for his second term.

But the opposition movement continued to gain momentum, as voters filled the streets day after day and confronted police and basij forces sent to quell their protests. Those shouting “Where is my vote?” turned to the phrase, “Allah-o Akbar,” or God is Great, a slogan of the Islamic revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Shah of Iran. They became more confrontational with riot police and the basij, groups which they associated with the beatings and tear gassing of fellow protestors. Soon thereafter, opposition supporters turned to other slogans, including “Death to Khamenei” and other, more pointed calls that signaled dissatisfaction with not only the outcome of the elections, but the nature of the regime itself.

Molavi concluded his speech by steering followers of Iran’s politics to the Iranian economy. He argued that several problems will begin to surface in a short time, including budget deficits, dwindling oil and gas reserves, current accounts deficits, and international pressure preventing the flow of money both into and out of Iran. The discussion then shifted to Karim Sadjadpour, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as he discussed foreign policy challenges facing the United States.

Sadjadpour, who frequently advises White House officials on Iran and Middle Eastern affairs, pointed to Afghanistan, Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and energy security as major foreign policy challenges facing the current Obama administration. He noted that Iran plays an integral role in every one of the above issues, and therefore, “shunning Iran is no longer an option for the U.S., and, quite frankly, military attacks are not at all a better option.” Instead Sadjadpour argued that the U.S., and any country looking to engage in dialogue with Iran, must understand why Iran behaves the way it does – is the state’s behavior driven as a reaction to U.S. policy or by a revolutionary ideology? Are the state’s attitudes transient or incapable of change?

Sadjadpour continued by explaining that steps taken by the Obama administration to reach out to the Iranian government, including two personal letters from President Obama to Ayatollah Khamenei, a New Year’s message from Obama to Iranians and the Iranian state, and President Obama’s deliberate use of the title “Islamic Republic of Iran,” in his addresses to Iran’s government, are all steps that have thrown Iran off guard. In other words, the Iranian regime needs the U.S. to be its adversary in order to gain legitimacy. Now that the U.S. has, in Sadjadpour words, “bent over backwards” to approach Iran, nothing will change unless Iranian officials follow suit and reformulate their foreign policy as well.

The last points discussed were the increasing influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iranian politics and business, as well as the possibility of future U.S. sanctions against Iran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was formed in 1979 in order to protect the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, is a division of Iran’s military with its own ground forces, navy, air force, intelligence, and special force, known as the basij. The group’s main goal is to protect national security through control of internal and border security, law enforcement, and Iran’s missile forces.

Karim Sadjadpour argued that “the Revolutionary Guard has eclipsed Iran’s clergy in terms of power over the state.” Ayatollah Khomeini personally handpicks the senior leadership of the IRGC. Furthermore, a majority of those that have served in this group later serve in the Majles, or as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors, and senior bureaucrats. As far as economic involvement, the IRGC can now be described as a conglomerate that controls Iran’s missile batteries, nuclear program, and also multibillion-dollar businesses in all sectors of the Iranian economy; in fact, it has been estimated that the IRGC controls about a third of Iran’s economy through subsidiaries and trusts.

Sadjadpour argues that in order for sanctions against Iran to be “constructive,” they must target the government rather than ordinary people. He gave the example of a non-constructive sanction, one against gasoline, which would hurt average citizens more than it would the regime. Because of the growing strength of the IRGC, Sadjadpour advocates establishing sanctions that will make it difficult for them to conduct business both domestically and internationally. This may then allow fissures to surface among members of the Guard, thereby bringing about their debilitation.

The speakers ended their program with a question and answer session in which they addressed inquiries from among the students and professors of the AU community. Both scholars were well-versed and provided the audience with unique insights and predictions for the future of Iran. Molavi and Sadjadpour emphasized the fact that although not much is clear about what will happen in the next few years, the opposition movement, the rising power of the Revolutionary Guard, and economic weakness will cause some extent of change to come about in Iran – for better or for worse.

For the past several decades, United States political discourse on Israel has been stifled, with a hawkishly pro-Israel agenda being the only option for politicians. That, at least, is the argument of J-street, a new group that defines itself as “Pro-Israel, Pro-Peace”. J-street sees itself as an organization that is freeing up space on Capitol Hill,  by giving a voice to what Director Jeremy Ben-Ami has dubbed “the Silent Majority” of American Jews who, while Pro-Israel, recognize that Israel’s security depends on the creation of a neighboring Palestinian State and the dismantling of settlements. J-street is not attempting to be all things to all people, yet its message and policies are intentionally broad enough to encompass a large swath of left-wing Jews, as well as people of other faiths and ethnic backgrounds who support two states. At it’s first annual conference, J-street finally brought together its disparate elements from around the United States (and the world), and began to meet the challenge of bringing its members into line with its core policy principles. At the same time J-street struggled to define itself as a movement that was open to criticism, debate and complex discussion of the issues at hand.

Before the main conference even started J-streetU, the semi-autonomous daughter of the J-street organization, which operates on college campuses, had its inaugural meeting. Boasting representatives from more than seventy college campuses, J-streetU seeks to position itself as the student arm of the Pro-peace movement. Thus, the sessions offered to the conference attendees were focused on building and developing the voice of J-streetU and on learning strategies for organization. The college climate being much different from the mainstream political structures, J-streetU is exploring different ways to be inclusive of many voices and sides, while still maintaining a Pro-peace basis. In an early session, Lauren Barr (Secretary of National J-streetU and American University student) explained that this was the reason that J-streetU decided on the slogan of “Pro-Peace” rather than “Pro-Israel, Pro-Peace”. Because J-streetU built its base from many existing campus organizations, some of which are now official J-streetU branches and others of which are only affiliates, its power came from building a broad platform. J-streetU includes groups from without the spectrum of Pro-peace groups, ranging from Pro-Israel groups, to Jewish and interfaith dialogue groups, to “Pro-Israel, Pro-Palestinian” groups.

In the first Plenary session of the first night of the J-street Conference itself, it was clear that J-street was going to be coming from a Pro-Israel perspective, that the organization was also committed to the same kind of dialogue and complexity as its daughter organization. The plenary started with some speeches by the various J-street machers, but lead into a discussion on the participants’ relationship with Israel, based on questions provided at the tables. Adding to the sense that J-street was trying to encourage a real and meaningful dialogue, they projected large screens at the front of the room, where tweets with the #jstconf09 tag could be seen, updating the room on the discussions that were taking place at the other tables and proposing new questions as the participants went along.

Further breakout sessions made it clear that while J-street was willing to make some clear policy statements, and that while on other issues it would be clear where the majority of J-street supporters stood, that conversation, dialogue and complexity were at the top of the agenda. InExamining the Jewish Social Justice/Israel Divide, speakers discussed the political leanings of the Jewish community as a whole, and the dichotomy between the relative ease in fundraising for organizations that promote Social Justice in America versus those who pursue such values in Israel. Strong arguments were made on the one hand, that Jewish organizations that are devoted to Social Justice must address Israel, and on the other hand that Jewish organizations are not usually all-encompassing, and that Jews can be expected to express their values through multiple communities. In the end, no agreement was reached, but the conversation was both realistic and civil. In a later session, Noa Baum presented A Land Twice Promised, in collaboration with Theater J. The program, a one woman show, was a riveting examination of similar narratives from the perspectives of an Israeli and a Palestinian woman living and conversing in California. Baum’s powerful presentation spoke to the ability of narrative to bring a dialogue past mere dispute of facts.

J-street’s willingness to embrace various sides and to engage in dialogue was also on display when Rabbi Eric Yoffie, President of The Union for Reform Judaism, a vocal critic of J-street, participated in a “Jewish Community Town Hall” alongside J-street director, Jeremy Ben-Ami. Yoffie was given an opportunity to speak about his positions and disagreements with J-street, and while he drew boos from a small minority during one especially vitriolic attack against the Goldstone Report, J-street’s leadership managed to maintain the crowds order. For many of his positions, in fact, Yoffie garnered applause. After he spoke,Jeremy Ben-Ami responded with a combination of conciliatory remarks, forthright challenges and a nuanced approach to the Goldstone report that came of as intelligent, understanding and dialogue-building, after which J-street again harnessed the power of social media to engage discussion throughout the room. Using a quote from Rabbi Yoffie’s remarks, the crowd was encouraged to debate the role of Israel’s military and the need for defense, again using twitter as a platform to apprise the room of the conversations going on at each table. Tweets ranged from the simple statement that “This is not a pacifist movement”, to the realization that dealing with military and physical power is something that the Jewish community as a whole had not had to deal with in nearly two millennia before the creation of Israel.

So what are we to make of all of this? J-street, an upstart organization not yet two years old, has splashed loudly onto the scene in Washington, claiming over 1500 delegates from various communities and college campuses around the U.S. In this, its first ever conference, J-street has taken a highly nuanced approach to the task of building a coalition. The political wisdom in this country is that a 5 second sound bite is about all that one can expect a crowd of people to listen to. Well – J-street can’t be said not to understand that. It’s name and its slogan (J-street, Pro-Israel, Pro-Peace) is designed for the media and the public. Yet, in this gathering of its committed supporters and activists, J-street has shown that it is not content with blanket statements, and hardline policies. Subtlety and dialogue is the name of the game. In bringing in the numbers that it did, in attracting Jewish leaders from across the country, in holding a civil dialogue with a vocal critic, and in spurring a crowd of people who have often been on the sidelines into action, J-street has shown that it stands ready to be a game-changer in how Israel advocacy in the United States works. While establishing the core of what it believes in, J-street has also created a new space for real, complex and thoughtful dialogue on issues surrounding the conflict in Israel and Palestine.

By: Roxy Araghi

Dr. Haleh Esfandiari, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Middle East Program and author of My Prison, My Home: One Woman’s Story of Captivity in Iran, visited American University this past Wednesday, October 21. She spoke about relations between Iran and the United States, the 2009 Iranian presidential elections, and her 105 day stay at Evin prison in Tehran, Iran during the year 2007.

In the last months of the year 2006, Dr. Esfandiari traveled to Iran to visit her 93-year old mother. One late December night, on her way to the airport to return to the United States, Dr. Esfandiari’s taxi was stopped by three masked men who stole her baggage, purse, and American and Iranian passports. Convinced that this episode was nothing but an ordinary robbery, Dr. Esfandiari went to the passport office a few days later to apply for new documents. When she arrived, she was invited to the Intelligence Ministry for interrogation.

During her presentation, Dr. Esfandiari explained that her work at the Woodrow Wilson Center involves inviting Iranian scholars, activists and NGO members to speak at the D.C. based think tank. Intelligence ministry officials in Iran suspected that Dr. Esfandiari was inviting these speakers as a means of recruiting them for the CIA. She noted that her interrogators exhibited “paranoia and fear” of the growing U.S. presence in the Middle East – including American troops in Iraq, NATO forces in Turkey, and increasing numbers of counterinsurgents in Afghanistan.

This was to be the first of many interrogations that would take place until May 8, 2007, the day Dr. Esfandiari was taken to Evin prison. Evin prison is a notorious facility in Iran that was built in the early 1970’s, during the Shah’s rule. It is mainly known for its holding of political prisoners. Dr. Esfandiari explained that upon arrival, she was told to stand next to all the other prisoners that had been arrested that same day. She was then blindfolded and led away by a woman guard. Dr. Esfandiari elaborated, “There is nothing as humiliating and debilitating as having to walk blindfolded; I felt like a child being moved from point A to point B without any idea as to what was going on around me.”

When her blindfold was removed, Dr. Esfandiari found herself in a cell with a broken sink, two barred windows, a blanket, and a Quran. Her interrogations began once again, sometimes lasting between eight and nine hours a day. She was questioned by two people throughout her stay, one of which she spoke to while facing the wall because she was not allowed to see his face. Dr. Esfandiari explained her interrogation process as one in which she was asked a question, responded verbally to the question, wrote the same answer on paper, and then signed the document to make her response official.

One day, Dr. Esfandiari was questioned about her relationship with then-Senator Obama. Dr. Esfandiari explained that she did not know the Senator personally, and asked why they would want to know such a thing. Her interrogator explained that he had mentioned her being in prison. Dr. Esfandiari was so happy that word had spread about her arrest that she immediately asked, “Anybody else?” Her interrogators answered, “Yes, Senator Clinton has also mentioned your case. But of course she would; you’re a woman, she’s a woman; you’re a feminist, she’s a feminist; you’re a democrat, she’s a democrat.”

The international attention brought to Dr. Esfandiari’s case eventually led to her release at the end of August 2007. Dr. Esfandiari is still working at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and promotes dialogue and diplomacy between nations in order to bring about international peace and stability.



By: Alexander B. Ward

Edited by: Roxy Araghi and Lindsay Crete
December 13, 2008

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) was perhaps unaware of the fervor they would create when they named Beijing, China as the host for the 2008 Olympiad.  Instantly, debate arose about the moral implications of such a decision. China is among the most despised states due to its constant amoral policies and complete disregard for human rights.  The abhorrence at the decision was manifest due to the great number of protestors who came from all over the world in an attempt to halt the Olympic torch’s progress in countries such as England, France and the United States.[ii] Although there are many proposed objections of the Chinese government’s actions, one of the biggest issues raised during the rallies was the illegal invasion and occupation of Tibet.

In 1949, the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army crossed over into the separate state of Tibet, infringing upon its sovereignty.  The PRC’s argument for the foray was that Tibet rightfully belonged to them since, from 1720 – 1792 AD, the Manchu empire ruled both territories; thus, Tibet had falsely claimed control over the land.  Lhasa, Tibet’s administrative capital, understood that what was happening to them was against many international norms that are reinforced by the condemnation of the United States, Britain, the Philippines and Thailand.  The PRC however, had 40,000 mobilized soldiers, which vastly outnumbered Tibet’s military reserve of 5,000 troops.  Thus, the Tibetan government had no choice but to sign The Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet of 1951, a document conjured up by the PRC that simply annexed Tibet into China and allowed for Chinese sovereignty over the domain.[iii] Even after the agreement, fighting continued in Tibet because the Chinese wanted His Holiness, the 14^th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, removed from his homeland.  Thus, in 1959, he fled through the mountains to northern India and established the government-in-exile in Dharamsala, where he still resides, among other displaced Tibetans who are unable to return to their homeland.[iv]

The protests began once the public realized the travesties developing.  Human rights activists supported the Dalai Lama by pointing to Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN which states “No one shall be subjected to…exile.”[v] Many of these activists joined groups, such as Amnesty International and began to make their voices heard so world leaders would take action.  A pro-Tibet lobby even came together on Capitol Hill to try and influence American officials to take a stance on the issue. Therefore, protestors can play an influential role in such matters, if they follow a certain course of action; however, protestors for Tibet’s liberation have been very ineffective. This is mainly because protestors are approaching the “enemy”,[vi] or China, in the completely wrong way.

The information revolution has sparked a new era in protesting.  In the United States, the Internet is being used more frequently to mobilize protestors for a cause.  For example, MoveOn.org, a website designed exclusively to post when and where rallies are being held, currently has 4.2 million subscribers after only ten years of existence.[vii] The success of this site ignited the way social networking pages like Facebook or MySpace were used, as they, too, started to engage citizens with issues that they most cared about.  With these websites in place, now most of the fighting against an issue is done from a computer instead of outside on the front lines.  Indeed, a pro-Tibet protestor was caught on record saying, “in the 80s it was very easy to get hundreds of people out to…protest.  Today, it’s difficult to bring together a hundred activists.”[viii] Now, people prefer blogging from their own home to speak out against an issue instead of grabbing a megaphone; nevertheless, the lack of a personal protest still has its advantages.  With the far reach of these new cyber-campaigns, everyday more people join to fight for an issue that matters to them, which not only increases numbers but also minimizes mobilization time.[ix] In order to make things move even faster, these organizations are now utilizing cell phones by sending text messages to subscribers.[x] The protestor can tell the website which issue he wants to receive text messages about, and when breaking news arrives it will be sent directly his or her cell phone.

China has become aware of the capabilities of the Internet and cell phones in starting revolts against their government and has itself begun to take action.  In order to keep their citizens away from these online campaigns, the Chinese authorities have “confiscated cell phones and computers, turned off cellular transmission facilities or cut landlines, and interfered with internet access.”[xi] Thus, Chinese citizens who oppose the authorities and Tibetans who are angered by PRC policies have little or no means of organization when it comes to protesting.  What this has done is cause a complete tilt in the demographic of the protestors on this issue:  90% of all pro-Tibet activists are American.[xii] China, then, has done a good job in keeping the angry voices halfway across the world as opposed to at home; its government officials may even feel safer now that they do not have to deal with opposition members outside their offices.

Yet, the Chinese and Tibetan activists are making a comeback.  Eastern Tibet now has well-developed mobile service, so the use of texting is growing exponentially every day. Unfortunately, Western Tibet’s mobile service is not as sophisticated as that of other areas in the region, and must therefore wait until new technologies arrive. It is perhaps this disparity in technological advancement that explains why so many more revolts are occurring in Eastern Tibet as opposed to Western Tibet.[xiii]

Despite all the great advances in activism, one cannot truly claim that the protestors have directly affected a positive step in the progression for Tibet’s liberation.  In fact, one of the better authorities on the issue, Patrick French, an author who spent many years living and studying in Tibet, said “It has been clear since the mid-1990s that the popular internationalization of the Tibet issue has had no positive effect on the Beijing government.”[xiv] Thus, it seems that all the effort put into making protesting more effective and efficient has gone to waste because Tibet is not “freer” than it was before the mobilization of the activists began.  Yet, still more people are signing up for text messages and blogging their opinions and some are still physically showing up to rallies in support of a free Tibet.[xv] Why, then, are people continuing with the failed strategy of protesting when the evidence shows that they have accomplished next to nothing in regards to Tibet’s freedom?[xvi]

People assume that just by showing up or publishing an article online that they are doing enough to help their cause – it fills them with a false sense of righteous morality.  Most of the protestors are well aware that their voice, simultaneously pooled with those of other activists, still will not make China budge.  China is not a democratic state, thus it will not feel compelled to listen to such groups, especially when the vast majority of those voices comes from the West.  It must be mentioned, however, that the outcries of the activists have made the United States government meet more urgently with the Dalai Lama to discuss strategies to free Tibet.  One of these talks included a proposal to have Tibet directly protected by the United States; however, if the U.S. “saved” Tibet, would Tibet still be considered “free” since it would be “protected” by one of the world’s major powers?[xvii] This question warrants a “no”, because instead of being free, the U.S. would only give Tibet the international military version of an IV drip.  Tibet would not be a country left to its own devices, but constantly dependent on the United States to keep it safe.  Thus, if getting the U.S. government involved with this issue is the one claim protestors can make, it is not a strong enough argument to say that they are making great strides towards Tibetan freedom.

Activists should take pride in the fact that they have changed the face of protesting, but they cannot be satisfied with the way they have used it to better Tibet’s situation.  Their approach has been based on the belief that China will act morally instead of rationally, but there is no incentive for China to give up Tibet when it increases their land area, opens new trading paths to Nepal, India, and Pakistan, and adds more citizens to their work force.[xviii] Also, as previously mentioned, China has a centrally located, communist government, not a democratic one, so the opinion of the people will very rarely – if at all – be honored.  Thus, a new strategy must be adopted in order to alter China’s perspective on this conflict.

The best way to alter the situation would be to negotiate with the Chinese, as opposed to trying to publicly humiliate them.  When the United States awarded the Dalai Lama the Congressional Gold Medal in October 2007[xix], Tibetans in China began to celebrate in the streets.  Giving a prestigious award to the man that the Chinese had called “the devil”[xx] did not sit well with Chinese government authorities, as they swiftly arrested and beat down many of the Dalai Lama’s supporters.[xxi] In this way, then, it can be said that the United States, the country where the majority of protestors come from, was responsible for a setback in the process of Tibet’s liberation.  This was not an isolated incident, as arrests and public beatings are commonplace in the Tibetan homeland.[xxii] Thus, when a protestor was caught saying, “Put lives on the line and protest!” he was speaking the truth, for death is a very possible outcome of protesting in China.[xxiii]

It seems that the Dalai Lama is among the first to notice that the initial strategy is now futile as he is now exploring diplomacy instead of demonstrations.  On April 21, 2008, he called for a meeting with United States President George W. Bush and his staff in order to seek a new strategy in the approach to China.  His Holiness was adamant that the help Tibet needed was “very significant.”[xxiv] Upon hearing the Dalai Lama’s new tactic, the President responded saying he “steadfastly supports the need for dialogue.”[xxv] It is clear, then, that a new strategy is being implemented in order to achieve the same means.  Both leaders have realized that staying the course was no longer effective and something different had to be done in order to make any further progress.

Perhaps the biggest change Tibet must make is to redefine the ultimate goal it wants to achieve.  It is highly improbable that China will release control of Tibet just because it is the moral thing to do.  Indeed, they will also have a hard time listening to Tibet’s ally, the United States, the same state that unconstitutionally invaded Iraq, tell them that they should hand over the territory.[xxvi] Therefore, Tibet must abandon their pursuit of the “middle way” – which dominates their way of life and their political demeanor on this issue – and attempt to obtain an agreement with China that will give the majority of power to the Chinese and a diminutive role to the Tibetan government.[xxvii] In a speech on October 25, 2008, the Dalai Lama seemed to have already adopted this new goal when he said that he no longer “seek[s] independence for his country, only greater autonomy and respect for Tibet’s culture, religion and language.”[xxviii] After many years of waiting for China to give him back his homeland it seems that “Mr. Patience has run out of patience” and is now seeking a simple negotiation.[xxix] It would be later that month that His Holiness and the government in Beijing would meet for the eighth time and, apparently, were suspected to be working on a framework where it would be possible for both parties to “keep the dialogue open.”[xxx] Today, these ongoing negotiations appear to be proceeding without any precondition and according to a Tibetan official, come across as being the best political discussions since the Dalai Lama’s first meeting with Chairman Mao in 1951.  Therefore, with great negotiations and a new goal, there is no reason that civil diplomacy cannot lead to an agreeable solution for both sides.

In retrospect, the act of protesting has actually not done anything directly to affect the situation between Tibet and China, but it was an important first step in reaching the end of the conflict.  It is very likely that if it were not for the public interest in this issue from the West, Tibet would have received little to no help from its government. The Dalai Lama has become a very sympathetic figure in the West – he is a man who cannot enter his own bedroom in Lhasa while countless tourists roam his palace on a daily basis.[xxxi] This major human right infringement alone was a significant reason for the massive outcries that soon followed.

While protesting was a good initial maneuver, it is now time, perhaps, to let the protestors rest and leave the future of Tibetans in their own hands.  After all, the immense effort exerted is ultimately for the benefit of the Tibetan people.  In fact, the Dalai Lama himself has recognized that even he is perhaps not the best suited person to achieve the goal of liberation when he said “Tibet’s future is for the Tibetan people to decide, not for me as an individual.”[xxxii] Thus, this statement now begins a shift of power away from the majority of Western protestors and government officials as it gives full responsibility to the people whose lives are directly affected by the conflict.  By saying this, His Holiness has attempted to give complete control to his people, telling them to keep fighting for their rights, but to do so as a Tibetan would: peacefully and respectfully.  If the Tibetan people embrace this idea, then the Dharma wheel will bring everything full circle and grant them their wish:  freedom.